If You Give the Court a Commerce Clause: An Environmental Justice Critique of Supreme Court Interstate Waste Jurisprudence by Davies, Lincoln L.
Fordham Environmental Law Review
Volume 11, Number 1 1999 Article 5
If You Give the Court a Commerce Clause: An
Environmental Justice Critique of Supreme
Court Interstate Waste Jurisprudence
Lincoln L. Davies∗
∗Stanford Law School
Copyright c©1999 by the authors. Fordham Environmental Law Review is produced by The
Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/elr
IF YOU GIVE THE COURT A COMMERCE
CLAUSE': AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
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PRELUDE
I have only visited landfills a handful of times in my
life, but my first trip left an indelible impression. When
I was eight, my family spent the good portion of a late-
March Saturday performing spring cleaning, activities
that had become the ritual since moving into the ma-
roon two-story house left somewhat dirty and unkempt
1. There is no telling what might happen if you give the
Court a Commerce Clause. By analogy, for instance, "If you give a
moose a muffin, he'll want some jam to go with it." Once you apply
the jam, the moose will want a number of muffins. When the muf-
fins are gone, the moose will want more. This will require a trip to
the store, a need for a sweater, and repairs to the sweater, includ-
ing buttons. The buttons will remind the moose of his grand-
mother's puppets. This will necessitate old socks, a subsequent
puppet show with accompanying stage and set- which requires
paint for scenery- and then sheets to hide the moose's antlers.
The sheets will remind the moose of Halloween. He will become
scared, fall, and knock over the paints. After using the sheet to
clean up the spilled paint, the moose will want to wash the sheet
and then hang it out to dry. While hanging the sheet outside, the
moose will see a blackberry bush. This will remind him of black-
berry jam. "He'll probably ask you for some. And chances are...
if you give him the jam, he'll want a muffin to go with it." LAURA
JOFFE NUMEROFF & FELICIA BOND, IF YOU GIVE A MOOSE A MUFFIN
(1991); see generally LAURA JOFFE NUMEROFF & FELICIA BOND, IF YOU
GIVE A MOUSE A COOKIE (1985); LAURA JOFFE NUMEROFF & FELICIA
BOND, IF You GIVE A PIG A PANCAKE (1998).
* J.D. expected, Stanford Law School, 2000; B.S., The Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1997. For their invaluable assistance
throughout the writing of this Note, I would like to thank Professor
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for our arrival. The air was thin that spring morning as
it often is in the Intermountain West, and I watched ea-
gerly as my father, grandfather, and uncle all worked to
pull a dead tree stump from the flowerbed in the front
yard.
Once the day's activities were complete, my father and
I climbed into the rusting-out dark red 1965 Chevrolet
pickup on loan from my grandfather, a truck affection-
ately referred to by all of our family as Leap 'n' Lena.
We headed west across the Salt Lake Valley, rubbish,
refuse, and dead tree stump in tow. Turning down a
dusty road, we eventually pulled up to a dull gray gate.
,My father got out of the truck, handed a man in grungy
overalls some crumpled bills, and reentered the growling
red monster. When we drove on, I could not believe
what I saw: all these marvelous things - shoes,
branches, combs, broken mirrors, bottles, and all other
manner of things wondrous to a child already possess-
ing too active an imagination - were heaped in mound
upon mound, circle of swarming seagulls after circle of
swarming seagulls. I headed straight for the nearest
discarded shampoo bottle, but my father quickly re-
strained me. This, he reminded, was a garbage dump..
for garbage. "How?" I wondered. "This stuff is so cooL"
I knew not then what I know now.
INTRODUCTION
Americans are greedy. We constitute only four-and-a-
half percent of the world's population,2 but, along with
Gerald Gunther; Katherine Ludwig, Solomon Noh, et al.; Daryl Nel-
son; Janet Scott and the Virginia Office of the Attorney General;
Professors Doreton Taylor and Paul Mohai; and, most importantly,
my wife, Kathleen, for assisting in gathering and analyzing census
data, and for her continual support.
2. See United States Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau
(last modified July 23, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/> (estimat-
ing 273,062,201 Americans and 6,000,973,731 people in the world
as of 11:39 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, July 23, 1999).
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the other industrialized countries containing an addi-
tional fifteen percent of the world's population, we con-
sume eighty-six percent of the world's gross domestic
product each year.3 In contrast, the fifth of the world's
population living in the poorest countries consume only
one percent of the world's resources on a yearly basis. 4
While much might be said about the implications of a
world so polarized by its resource distribution,5 this
Note focuses instead on another aspect correlated with
American consumption of vast amounts of resources.
For attendant with our consumer-heavy habits is our
propensity to waste. Indeed, every American produces
approximately 4.4 pounds of garbage a day, which
equals over 180 million tons a year, and is collected by
municipalities to the tune of $23 billion. 6  Indeed,
somewhere between eighty to ninety percent of munici-
pal waste eventually finds its way into landfills. 7
These landfills often take up very valuable land, and a
lot of it. For instance, the Fresh Kills landfill on New
3. See United Nations Development Programme, Human De-
velopment Report 1999: Press Kit (visited July 26, 1999)
<http://www.undp.org/hrdo/El.htm>. For a commentary on the
emptiness of America's culture of consumerism, see MITCH ALBOM,
TUESDAYS WITH MORRIE 108- 14, 135-42 (1997).
4. See United Nations Development Programme,
supra note 3.
5. See generally UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1999 (1999); cf, e.g., Xavier Carlos
Vasquez, The North American Free Trade Agreement and Envircn-
mental Racism, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 364-74 (1993) (describing
NAFTA's disproportionately negative environmental effects on the
U.S.-Mexico border and within Mexico because of Mexico's lower
environmental standards); Hugh J. Marbury, Note, Hazardous
Waste Exportation: The Global Manifestation of Environmental Ra-
cism, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 251, 293 (1995) (advocating dis-
posal of hazardous waste proximate to its place of generation
rather than in countries where it was not employed).
6. See Information Please, Encyclopedia Entry: Solid Waste
(visited July 26, 1999) <http://cbs.infoplease.com/ce5/CE048556.
html>.
7. See id.
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York's Staten Island, which is slated for closure on De-
cember 31, 2001,8 has a total of approximately 2,200
acres. 9 Moreover, landfills do not typically brighten the
neighborhoods into which they move, bringing with
them rank smells, increased traffic, rats, flies, toxic
waste, potential groundwater contamination, and, of
course, tons of garbage. 0 Americans are not naive
about the effects of our actions on the environment, 1
and we attempt to regulate those effects fairly exhaus-
tively. 12
One judicial doctrine, however, limits the ways in
which Americans can regulate the amount of waste we
dump into our landfills. The Dormant Commerce
Clause disallows states from economically discriminat-
ing against other states in their management of garbage,
if that management affects interstate commerce. While
this doctrine has suffered extensive criticism,13 the Su-
preme Court continues to invariably employ it, using it
to strike down state laws that regulate waste disposal
but fetter the flow of that waste from one state to the
next.
This Note criticizes the Court's doctrine and its re-
straints on state environmental laws from one more an-
gle - the environmental justice theory - and con-
cludes that at every turn, the Dormant Commerce
Clause miserably fails the environmental justice cri-
tique. Part I of this Note provides a background for en-
vironmental justice, explaining its history and context,
and fully outlining the movement's theoretical under-
8. See infra Part V.A.
9. See The Fresh Kills Landfill Map (visited Jan. 9, 2000)
<http://www.ci.ny.us>.
10. See infra Part IV.A.
II. But see generally PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH,
THE BETRAYAL OF SCIENCE AND REASON: How ANTI-ENVIRONMENTAL
RHETORIC THREATENS OUR FUTURE (1997) (warning of the danger of
buying into "brownlash" literature).
12. See infra note 257.
13. See infra Part Ill.
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pinnings. Part II summarizes the Supreme Court's
Dormant Commerce Clause cases involving interstate
movement of waste, and Part III extracts the traditional
criticisms of the Clause. Part IV applies the environ-
mental justice theory developed in Part I to the Supreme
Court's doctrine. Finally, Part V applies the environ-
mental justice critique of the Dormant Commerce
Clause to Virginia's recent attempt to curb garbage im-
ports, and finds that the district court judge's opinion to
enjoin enforcement of Virginia's new disposal laws vio-
lates the principles of environmental justice, but per-
haps predictably, follows the path the Supreme Court
has laid: a Commerce Clause less and less tolerant of
state attempts to protect their environment, and likely
more and more blind to minorities and people of lower
income.
I. BACKGROUND: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Most accounts of the history of American environ-
mentalism begin with nineteenth century Transcen-
dentalism and Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Em-
erson, and Winslow Homer. These accounts elaborate
on the debates between John Muir's preservationist
camp and Gifford Pinchot's conservationist/utilitarian
retinue, debates that were galvanized by the Hetch
Hetchy dam controversy, and conclude by discussing
Rachel Carson's Silent Spring and its lingering effects,
including the proliferation of both environmental groups
and modem environmental law.14 This "classic" history
is neat, clean, and easy to weave, but it is not complete.
To be sure, most environmental historians have either
blatantly ignored or simply overlooked the fuller, more
complex history of American environmentalism. The
14. See, e.g., LESTER W. MILBRATH, ENVIRONMENTALISTS:
VANGUARD FOR A NEW SOCIETY (1984); RODERICK. NASH, WILDERNESS
AND THE AMERICAN MIND (3d ed., 1982); R.E. Dunlap & K.D. Van
Liere, The "New Environmental Paradigm," 9 J. ENVTL. EDUC. 4
(1978).
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American environmentalist movement has been painted
white, and left two-dimensional. In reality, however, the
movement is not monochrome, and it contains many
wrinkles, folds, and intertwined developments.
Although the preservationist/conservationist dichot-
omy is what seems to have defined American environ-
mentalism, other important influences and ideals helped
to drive the movement forward. When the movement
began in the nineteenth-century, for instance, the urban
working class used arguments about the environmental
inequalities they faced - such as poor sanitation, over-
crowding, rampant disease, and lack of clean water -
to fight for access to greenspace by developing neigh-
borhood parks. 15 Similarly, nineteenth-century urban,
middle-class women campaigned for better sanitation,
campaigns that by the early twentieth century evolved
into concerns for quality of life issues in general, and
eventually also became part of the rural and suburban
agenda. 16 While the mainstream American environ-
mental movement - especially as traditionally por-
trayed - has been dominated by Caucasians, this too
leaves important figures out of the environmentalist
picture. During the nineteenth century, Native Ameri-
cans were betrayed and abused by the U.S.
government, 17 Latinos and Asians were relegated to the
most difficult jobs and paid the lowest of wages, and Af-
rican-Americans did not obtain Constitutional rights
until after the Civil War.' 8 These deplorable and unjust
conditions left American minorities little room to play a
15. See Dorceta E. Taylor, American Environmentalism: The
Role of Race, Class and Gender in Shaping Activism 1820-1995, 5
RACE, GENDER & CLASS 16, 21 (1997). "These parks provided free or
cheap leisure for the working class and soon became the focal point
of environmental and political rallies." Id.
16. See id. at 21-24, 32.
17. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
50- 143 (1982) (tracing the legal treatment of American Indians
from 1532 to 1928).
18. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 24-29.
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part in the environmental movement, but by the twenti-
eth century their influence began to be felt. For exam-
ple, in the early 1900s, unionized people of color fought
for better working conditions. 19 In 1951, husbands and
wives joined to picket silver and zinc mine employers for
not only better wages, but also for improved sanitation
and drinking water. 20 And in 1969, the Quinault tribe
in the Pacific Northwest closed twenty-nine miles of
beach to the public to prevent littering and other envi-
ronmental degradation. 21
Despite the richness minorities, women, and people of
lower income have added to the mainstream environ-
mental movement, their contributions have continually
been overlooked. Indeed, by the 1980s and 1990s the
mainstream environmental movement had marginalized
minorities, the poor, and their interests. The movement
had become a "white, middle-class [movement focused
on] . . . conservation, pollution control, species and
habitat preservation .... and consumer protection."2 2 A
movement purporting to protect the environment for the
sake of humanity while at the same time ignoring an
entire segment of society could not stand without criti-
cism for long, and environmentalism did not.
19. See id. at 33-34. American racial minorities often did
not participate in other environmental activism in the early part of
the nineteenth century because they were forced to place their pri-
mary concern with the daily racial discrimination they faced in the
workplace. They understood that eradicating racism was a condi-
tion precedent to relieving occupational discrimination. See gener-
ally, e.g., ANDREW HURLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUALITIES: CLASS,
RACE, AND INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION IN GARY, INDIANA, 1945-1980 (1995).
20. See TERESA AMOTr & JULIE MATrHAEI, RACE, GENDER, AND
WORK: A MULTICULTURAL HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 78
(1991).
21. SeeVINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED 14-15 (1973).
22. Richard Hofrichter, Introduction to TOXic STRUGGLES:
THE TEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 1, 1 (Richard
Hofrichter ed., 1993) [hereinafter TOXiC STRUGGLES).
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A. History of the Environmental Justice Movement
Written out of the plot by environmental historians,
and left to fend for their own, often non-wilderness-
centered interests by the mainstream environmental
movement,23 poor and minority communities became
dumping grounds for the byproducts of industrial soci-
ety. Residents of these communities certainly under-
stood that they were bearing the brunt of the nation's
pollution,24 but the mainstream environmental move-
ment - much as it had with the contributions given to
it by women, minorities, and the working class - over-
looked the dilemma. In 1987, however, environmental-
ism changed forever, 25 and the environmental justice
movement was born. The United Church of Christ's
(UCC) Commission for Racial Justice released a study
that statistically proved minority and low-income com-
munities were, in fact, disproportionately burdened by
our country's pollution. 26 Other studies further sub-
23. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 47-49 (characterizing the
mainstream environmental movement as a "reformist" one, and
noting that its organizations had grown "increasingly big, bureauc-
ratized, hierarchical, and distant from local concerns and politics").
24. For an example of a local battle against environmental
injustice, see generally COLIN CRAWFORD, UPROAR AT DANCING RABBIT
CREEK: BATTLING OVER RACE, CLASS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1996)
(chronicling environmental justice activities in Noxubee County,
Mississippi).
25. At least one commentator argues that environmentalism
has now been subsumed by the broader movement of sustainable
development- in large part due to the environmental justice
movement's influence on mainstream environmentalism. See J. B.
Ruhl, The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and Environ-
mental Justice: Cooperation, then Competition, then Conflict, 9 DUKE
ENvTL. L. & POL'YF. 161, 177-78 (1999).
26. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF
CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL
REPORT ON RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE CITES (1987). The United
States General Accounting Office had published a study four years
earlier, but it had gone largely unnoticed until the UCC study was
released. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS
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stantiating the UCC's conclusions followed, 27 and al-
though based in the grassroots, the environmental jus-
tice movement became a national phenomenon.
The extent to which the environmental justice move-
ment had become a national phenomenon was apparent
in 1991 at the People of Color Environmental Leader-
ship Summit. There, the movement for the first time
adopted a formal statement of its ideology and goals, a
document entitled the Principles of Environmental Jus-
tice.28 In 1994, President Clinton added to the reach of
the movement by mandating that all federal agencies
must consider and address their impact on minority and
low-income communities. 29 An explosion of environ-
mental justice literature also occurred in academe, fur-
ther amplifying both the definition and application of
environmental justice. 30 Perhaps most importantly, en-
vironmental justice advocates began to forge solutions
to the disproportionate problems they faced. Some
communities forced polluters and waste sites away from
their neighborhoods or were able to ensure compliance
with environmental laws;31 where brownfields redevel-
WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC
STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983).
27. See generally, e.g., PAT COSTNER & JOE THORNTON,
PLAYING WITH FIRE, HAZARDOUS WASTE INCINERATION: A GREENPEACE
REPoRT (1990); BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN & LAURA FrrrON, Toxic WASTES
AND RACE REVISITED (1994); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 1
ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES (1992);
Marianne Lavelle & Marica Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial
Divide in Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at SI.
28. See infra Appendix A. For an analysis of how these
principles influence environmental justice theory, see infra Part I.C;
see also Taylor, supra note 15, at 53 (arguing that the Principles
created an "environmental justice paradigm").
29. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 2629 (1994).
30. See infra Part I.C.
31. See, e.g., Robert W. Collin & William Harris, Sr., Race
and Waste in Two Virginia Communities, in CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS 93, 98-100
(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993) (discussing how one group of citizens
defeated having a nuclear waste site located in their community)
1999] 215
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opment took place within environmental justice areas, it
improved those communities both ecologically and fi-
nancially; 32 and a number of advocates began to outline
other possible policy and also more pragmatic, ground-
level solutions. 33
The fight is not over, however, and there is still much
work to be done. For a few success stories do not a
make an ultimate victory, and protecting the environ-
ment has never been a simple thing, especially when
attempting to do so in a just and equitable manner. 34
[hereinafter CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM]; Winona LaDuke,
A Society Based on Conquest Cannot Be Sustained: Native Peoples
and the Environmental Crisis, in Toxic STRUGGLES, supra note 22, at
105-06 (summarizing four instances where Native Americans "suc-
cessfully resisted the destruction of their land and lives"); Cynthia
Hamilton, Women, Home and Community: The Struggle in an Urban
Environment, RACE, POVERTY & THE ENV'T, Apr. 1990, at 3, 10-13
(examining a women-led grassroots organization in South Central
Los Angeles).
32. See Lincoln L. Davies, Note, Working Toward a Common
Goal? Three Case Studies of Brownfields Redevelopment in Envi-
ronmental Justice Communities, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 317-23
(1999).
33. See, e.g., Richard Hofrichter, Cultural Activism and Envi-
ronmental Justice, in Toxic STRUGGLES 85, 93-96 (noting that the
"creation and reaffirmation of community culture can advance
grass-roots organizing for environmental justice"); Eileen Gauna,
The Environmental Justice Misfit Public Participation and the Para-
digm Paradox, 17 STAN ENVTL. L.J. 33, 70 (1998) (arguing that ad-
ditional public participation in the policy and land use decision-
making processes can only improve environmental justice); Alice
Kaswan, Environmental Laws: Grist for the Equal Protection Mill, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 387, 427-56 (1999) (outlining hurdles environ-
mental justice advocates must meet when using the Constitution's
equal protection clause to bring claims).
34. Environmental problems are complex and multi-faceted,
combining aspects of biophysical and social science, policy goals
and value judgments, and economic and other interests of current
and future generations. See generally, e.g., STUART L. PIMM, THE
BALANCE OF NATURE? (1991); Kenneth Arrow et al., Economic
Growth, Carrying Capacity, and the Environment, 268 SCIENCE 520
(1995); Gretchen Daily & Paul Ehrlich, Population, Sustainability,
and Earth's Carrying Capacity, 42 BIOSCIENCE 761, 770 (1992);
Norman Myers, Consumption in Relation to Population, Environment
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Though certainly not as crucial to eliminating environ-
mental injustice as, say, removing lead from poor and
minority communities might be, 35 one of the things that
still requires attention on the environmental justice
front is providing a complete definition to and a cohesive
theory of environmental justice. The Principles of Envi-
ronmental Justice36 took the first and perhaps furthest
step forward in that effort, but most scholarship until
now has largely focused on either demonstrating the
existence of environmental inequities, 37 or discussing
individual applications within the movement and spe-
cific instances where communities have faced dispro-
portionate ecological hardship. 38 A handful of recent
and Development, 17 ENVIRONMENTALIST 33 (1997); Terry L. Root &
Stephen H. Schneider, Ecology and Climate: Research Strategies
and Implications, 269 SCIENCE 334 (1995). Adding justice and eq-
uity to the equation only further complicates it. See, e.g., J. B.
Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for
Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 63-64 (1999) (summa-
rizing how environment, equity, and economic growth must be
maximized over time and space).
35. For a discussion of lead poisoning in environmental
justice communities, see Janet Phoenix, Getting the Lead out of
Communities, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM 77, 77-92.
36. See infra Appendix A.
37. See supra notes 26-27.
38. See generally, e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIX-
IE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990); CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 31 (addressing lead poisoning
and pesticide exposure, and examining specific studies in Alabama,
Colorado, New Mexico, and Virginia); RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE (Bunyan Bryant &
Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (considering the need for minority involve-
ment in environmental groups, consumption of toxic fish in Detroit
and Michigan generally, and occupational hazard for minorities)
[hereinafter RACE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS]; TOxIC STRUGGLES,
supra note 22 (addressing gender-based critiques of mainstream
environmentalism, occupational hazard disparities, and the global
connection in environmental inequity); UNEQUAL PROTECTION:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR (Robert D. Bul-
lard ed., 1994) (examining instances of environmental injustice in
specific communities, including Indian Creek, Warren County, and
Texarkana) [hereinafter UNEQUAL PROTECTION]; WHO PAYS THE PRICE?
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works examine environmental justice from other social
paradigms, 39 but they still largely leave explicitly coa-
lescing the theoretical underpinnings of the movement
in the creases. The next two sub-Parts of this Note
briefly define environmental justice, and then attempt to
provide a complete examination of environmental justice
theory. The latter of these attempts will provide the
framework on which this Note later critiques the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause. 40
THE SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS (Barbara Rose
Johnston ed., 1994) (discussing, among other things, the Ya-
nonami and China) [hereinafter WHO PAYS THE PRICE?].
39. See Sheila Foster, Race(ial) Matters: The Quest for Envi-
ronmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721, 730-52 (1993) (examining
environmental justice from a critical race perspective); Gloria E.
Helfand & L. James Peyton, A Conceptual Model of Environmental
Justice, 80 Soc. SCIENCE Q. 68, 74-77 (1999) (arguing that hazard-
ous waste siting decisions can often be explained by analyzing the
cost-benefit curves of affected residents, communities decision-
makers, and industries); Ralph M. Perhac, Jr., Environmental Jus-
tice: The Issue of Disproportionality, 21 ENVTL. ETHICS 81, 85-91
(analyzing environmental justice from utilitarianism, natural rights
theory, and Rawlsian contractarianism); Taylor, supra note 15, at
19-30, 32-39, 43-47, 49-56 (tracing the involvement of women, mi-
norities, and the working class in the environmental movement
from a historical perspective); Dorceta A. Taylor, The Urban Envi-
ronment: The Intersection of White Middle-Class and White Working-
Class Environmentalism (1820-1950s), 7 HUMAN ECOLOGY 202, 207-
24 (1998) (using social movement theory), Robert R.M. Verchick, In
a Greener Voice: Feminist Theory and Environmental Justice, 19
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 23, 30-54 (1996) (applying feminist method,
contextual reasoning, and consciousness-raising); Rozelia S. Park,
Note, An Examination of International Environmental Racism through
the Lens of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, 5 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 703-09 (1998) (using sovereignty as a
model); see also Kaswan, supra note 33, at 396-407 (condensing
environmental justice into two primary tenets); Ruhl, supra note
25, at 177-84 (explaining the "co-evolutionary" relationship of envi-
ronmental justice and sustainable development).
40. See infra Part IV.
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B. Defining Environmental Justice
Because environmental justice grew along with - and
in many ways, out of- mainstream environmentalism, 41
it is easiest to define the movement by discussing how it
is similar to and different from its historical companion.
Indeed, such analysis shows that environmental justice
and mainstream environmentalism are at once deeply
intertwined and'forcefully divergent. Their relationship
is a schizophrenic one: sometimes that of a loving
mother and her adoring daughter, sometimes feuding
siblings interned in a never-ending dispute.
1. Similarities
Mainstream environmentalism and environmental
justice share a common core: on a general level, both
movements are concerned with attaining ecological
protection. 42 In this respect, the two movements are at
times interlocking. Although not always the case, re-
moving environmental injustices usually advances goals
that fall within the mainstream environmental move-
ment. When the mainstream movement obtains ecologi-
cal protection that benefits society as a whole, the goals
of environmental justice are advanced. 43 Moreover, both
movements use some of the same techniques to advance
their goals, including environmental education and per-
sonal behavior change. Both movements also often fo-
cus on critiquing negative effects of technology, espe-
cially pollution and toxic waste.44
41. See Ruhl, supra note 25, at 178-80; Taylor, supra note
15, at 19-30, 32-39, 43-47, 49-56.
42. However, at more specific levels- each movement's em-
phases of environmental protection- they differ. See infra Part
I.B.2.
43. Of course, when environmental goods are not distrib-
uted evenly, or when ecological harms are disproportionate, pri-
mary examples of environmental injustice abound.
44. However, mainstream environmentalism has only in-
cluded this critique since the 1960s and 1970s. Taylor, supra note
1999] 219
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2. Differences
While environmental justice and mainstream envi-
ronmentalism are in part housed within the same
structure - they share portions of the same founda-
tion, and from time to time use the same walls and
doorways - they also distinctly differ. Such differences
are perhaps most pronounced when the two movements
are employed in the real world. Maititream environ-i
mentalism is broad, overarching, and continually en-
compassing more and more issues within its grasp,
while environmental justice activism typically arises
over narrower, more discrete disputes such as waste
disposal siting decisions. 45 Likewise, environmentalism
has evolved to incorporate environmental justice, while
the latter movement continues by attempting to distin-
guish itself from the mainstream. As Professor Ruhl
notes, "In the sustainable development framework, eq-
uity is co-equal with environment and economy. In the
environmental justice framework, equity is placed above
all else. Sustainable development is a multi-trait, long-
term policy optimizer, whereas environmental justice is
a single-trait, short-term policy maximizer."46 The two
movements also differ in a number of other respects.
Emphases of environmental protection. Although
mainstream environmentalism and environmental jus-
tice share a common general goal of protecting our eco-
systems, each movement often targets dissimilar spe-
cific areas of protection. For the mainstream, Pinchot's
15, at 41. Environmental justice, on the other hand, has used it
since the movement's inception. See id. at 52-53.
45. See Ruhl, supra note 25, at 180-82. But see, e.g., Ho-
frichter, supra note 22, at 4-6 ("Environmental justice is about so-
cial transformation directed toward meeting human need and en-
hancing the quality of life- economic quality, health care, shelter,
human rights, species preservation, and democracy- using re-
sources sustainably."); Taylor, supra note 15, at 52-53 (contending
that, at least from a theoretical vantage, environmental justice
broadened the mainstream movement).
46. Ruhl, supra note 25, at 180.
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conservationism and Muir's preservationism are still
very much alive; the movement centers on wilderness,
wildlife, and recreation. 47  In contrast, environmental
justice focuses on disproportionate impacts of ecological
deterioration, especially in the context of contaminants,
human rights, working-class concerns, and access to
natural resources and greenspace. 48 Indeed, environ-
mental justice tries to link "occupational, community,
economic, enviroimental,. and social justice issues ...
"49
Membership. Another difference in the two movements
is in their memberships. There are two primary differ-
ences here. First and perhaps predictably so, environ-
mental justice groups enjoy more diverse memberships
than do mainstream groups. In fact, approximately
fifty-eight percent of environmental justice groups serve
either Native Americans 50 or African American constitu-
ents.51 Another twenty-four percent serve a mixture of
minority constituents, while fifteen percent serve Lati-
nos or Asians, and three percent serve a mixture of mi-
nority and white constituents. 52 Mainstream groups, on
the other hand, are overwhelmingly Caucasian. 53
47. See BULLARD, supra note 38, at 10-11; Taylor, supra
note 39, at 208.
48. See Taylor, supra note 15, Minorities and people of
lower income have been denied equal access to environmental re-
sources throughout time, but one specific context in which envi-
ronmental goods have been offered disproportionately is the urban
park. See Dorceta E. Taylor, Central Park as a Model for Social
Control: Urban Parks, Social Class and Leisure Behavior in Nine-
teenth-Century America, 31 J. LEISURE RESEARCH 1, 32-33 (forth-
coming 1999).
49. Taylor, supra note 15, at 54; see Deeohn Ferris, A Call
for Justice and Equal Environmental Protection, in UNEQUAL
PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 298.
50. I define Native Americans as including Alaska Natives,
American Indians, and Native Hawaiians.
51. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 54.
52. See id.
53. See Dorceta Taylor, Can the Environmental Movement At-
tract and Maintain the Support of Minorities?, in RACE AND
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Moreover, environmental justice groups share in leader-
ship diversity, often with women taking the helm.54 But
nearly eighty percent of mainstream groups have male
leaders. 55
Second, environmental justice groups are almost al-
ways grassroots; local citizens work to solve local prob-
lems. Yet mainstream environmental groups have be-
come large hierarchical bureaucracies, often working in
cooperation with industries and divorced from local is-
sues.56 These structural differences in the two move-
ments' memberships also influence the methods the two
movements employ to institute change.
Methods and posture. Mainstream groups generally
use incremental or reformist measures such as lobbying
and direct mail campaigns to further their goals, 57 while
environmental justice groups often take more radical or
refractory actions to implement the changes they seek.
Indeed, one of the touchstones of environmental justice
groups is that they are "action-oriented."5 8 Although
their varied methods distinguish the two groups, an
analysis of their heritages shows that this difference is
rather predictable. Over two-thirds of environmental
justice organizations formed in 1980 or later, but nearly
three-quarters of mainstream environmental organiza-
tions formed prior to 1980.59 This implies that pre-
dominantly Caucasian groups have a greater likelihood
of having been formed in conjunction with the well-
evolved and polished mainstream environmentalism and
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 28, 28; John H. Adams, The Mainstream
Environmental Movement: Predominately White Memberships Are Not
Defensible, EPA J., at 25, 26 (Mar./Apr. 1992).
54. See Barbara Epstein, Ecofeminism and Grass-roots Envi-
ronmentalism in the United States, in Toxic STRUGGLES, supra note
22, at 149.
55. See DONALD SNOW, INSIDE THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT:
MEETING THE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE 48-49 (1992).
56. See Hofrichter, supra note 22, at 7.
57. See id.
58. Ferris, supra note 49, at 298-99.
59. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 54-55.
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the already-developed procedures, methods of operation,
and agendas carried with it. However, predominantly
minority groups are more likely to have deliberately
splintered from the mainstream because their interests
were not being looked after. In fact, sixty-one percent of
environmental justice groups did not begin as environ-
mental groups at all;60 their heritage often lies in the
Civil Rights Movement or other more militant causes
such as the Chicano Movement 61 and the American In-
dian Movement. 62
Worldview: environmental protection as a good versus
as a right. Finally, environmental justice and main-
stream environmentalism differ in what might be called
their "worldviews." The mainstream movement ad-
vances its goal of protecting the environment under the
assumption that ecological protection is a good to hu-
mans that must be balanced with the negative byprod-
ucts of our modem industrialized society.63 Indeed, en-
vironmental economists devote their careers to analyz-
ing the tradeoffs between environmental protection and
environmental harm. 64 There is, they argue, an "opti-
mal" level of pollution, and equity is only a matter of
distribution. 65
60. See id.
61. For a discussion of the Chicano Movement, see RODOLFO
ACUNA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS 307-58 (3rd ed..
1988).
62. An example of the tactics used by the American Indian
Movement includes their occupation of Alcatraz Island in San
Francisco Bay during 1969. For a history of American Indian ac-
tivism, including the occupation of Alcatraz, see PAUL CHAAT SMITH
& ROBERT ALLEN WARRIOR, LIKE A HURRICANE: THE INDIAN MOVEMENT
FROM ALCATRAZ TO WOUNDED KNEE (1996).
63. This is perhaps largely an outcome of the incremental,
reformist tactics the movement employs; compromise is at the
heart of lobbying for and legislating change. See supra notes 57-62
and accompanying text.
64. See generally DAVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY TURNER,
ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1990); TOM
TIETENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY (1994).
65. See id.
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Conversely, environmental justice advocates contend
that access to natural resources and environmental
protection are fundamental human rights.66 Distribu-
tion of ecological harms is certainly an important con-
cern, but an environmental justice analysis cannot end
there. Instead, the right to live in an uncontaminated
environment is inextricably tied to the rights to pursue
life and happiness; a sustainable environment is the
foundation on which life and happiness must grow.67 As
a right, environmental protection, at least according to
environmental justice advocates, must receive an un-
compromising stature rather than one in which it is
balanced against other concems.6 8 For environments in
which people live, the only acceptable level of pollution
is one at which they are not harmed, and when people
are being harmed, "pollution optimality" is only an in-
sult.
C. Environmental Justice Theory
While defining the environmental justice movement,
especially in juxtaposition with mainstream environ-
66. See infra Appendix A, at Principles 1, 3-5, 7-8, 10. See
generally Barbara Rose Johnston, The Abuse of Human Environ-
mental Rights: Experience and Response, in WHO PAYS THE PRICE?
219 (discussing how environmental injustice violates human
rights); but see South East Lake View Neighbors v. Department of
Hous. and Urban Dev., 685 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that
recovery for environmental damages is not a right). Compare 42
U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1994) (recognizing that "each person should enjoy
a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility
to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environ-
ment") (emphasis added).
.67. See infra Appendix A at Principle 1.
68. Cf. Mark Ritchie, Trading Away the Environment: Free-
Trade Agreements and Environmental Degradation, in TOXIC
STRUGGLES, supra note 22, at 209, 212-18 (describing how using
"free-market" economics as opposed to "sustainable" development
has harmed environmental justice communities in the developing
world).
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mentalism, is not a very perplexing matter, describing
the theoretical underpinnings of environmental justice
is apparently a more difficult task. The Principles of En-
vironmental Justice69 began setting forth a cohesive
paradigm of the movement. But these Principles are
rather limited in scope, 70 and nothing else has presented
a truly comprehensive analysis of environmental justice
.theory. Using the Principles - and gleaning from other
environmental justice literature - this sub-Part at-
tempts to outline four tenets that comprise the envi-
ronmental justice paradigm.
1. Distributional Justice
What forms the core of environmental justice is what
the movement was born out of: an aspiration for dis-
tributional justice. Indeed, if one tenet alone were to
define environmental justice, it would be the move-
ment's striving for equity - fair distribution of environ-
mental goods and harms. This is where the movement's
discovery of disproportionate environmental burdens for
minorities, the poor, and history of the civil rights
movement merge, and where the rivers of activism and
environmental rights run together. While other types of
distributional environmental injustices might exist, at
minimum the environmental justice movement seeks
three types of distributional justice.
Pollution and environmental harms. The movement
first seeks to correct the problems that brought envi-
ronmental injustice to the forefront of the environmental
community's attention: unequal and unfair distribution
of pollution, toxic waste, and other environmental
harms.7' In a perfect world, the movement would elimi-
nate all human exposure to such toxics,7 2 but in the im-
69. See infra Appendix A.
70. See id. at Principles 4, 6, 8-9, 11-15.
71. See supra notes 26-27.
72. See infra Appendix A, at Principles 4, 6, 8.
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perfect world where we live, the movement would reduce
exposure as much as possible, and make exposure
equal across all races, classes, and nations. 73
Natural resources and environmental goods. Intercon-
nected with the skewed distribution of pollution is an
inequitable distribution of access to natural resources
and other environmental goods. 74 By default, people
who have polluted air and polluted water do not have
the same access to clean air and clean water as do other
citizens. Moreover, minorities and the poor historically
have been denied equal access to resources such as
parks and other greenspace, 75 and this problem contin-
ues today.7 6 Environmental justice seeks to eliminate it.
Environmental laws. In 1992, the National Law Jour-
nal published a groundbreaking study that revealed dis-
crimination in environmental law enforcement. Not only
were minorities and the poor bearing the brunt of soci-
ety's pollution, but they also were not receiving equal
protection from such harms.77 A third aspect of the
movement's distributional justice tenet seeks equal
protection of environmentally disadvantaged communi-
ties under our nation's laws.78 Without this, distribu-
tional justice is unlikely. And even if somehow dis-
tributional justice were obtained without equal applica-
tion and prosecution of environmental laws, it would be
unstable and in many ways incomplete.
73. See id. at Principles 9, 12; see also BULLARD, supra note
38, at I I (discussing "environmental elitism"); Robert D. Bullard,
Conclusion: Environmentalism with Justice, in CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 31, at 195, 204-06 (outlining a
solution-oriented "environmental justice framework").
74. See infra Appendix A, at Principle 3.
75. See Taylor, supra note 48, at 32-33.
76. See Martin Khor Kok Peng, Economics and Environment-
al Justice: Rethinking North-South Relations, in Toxic STRUGGLES,
supra note 22, at 219, 221-25 (examining unequal access to re-
sources from an international perspective).
77. See generally Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 27.
78. See Foster, supra note 39, at 729-30; see also infra Ap-
pendix A, at Principle 2.
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2. Political Justice
In addition to the three levels of distributional justice
sought by the environmental justice movement, advo-
cates of environmental justice also hope to obtain a
greater measure of political justice than minorities and
the poor received in the past.79 One of the corollaries of
political justice is largely in the vein of the civil rights
movement and 'reflects the environmental justice move-
ment's historical roots in civil rights advocacy: political
justice must include greater representation of minorities
and people of lower income.8 0
Moreover, true political justice for the environmental
justice movement means that not only would disadvan-
taged communities receive equal access to environ-
mental goods - and equal protection from environ-
mental harms - but they would also have a voice in
how those harms and goods are distributed.8 1 Impor-
tantly, however, this voice must not be cast upon closed
ears. Indeed, environmental justice advocates often face
a number of barriers to representing their cause, in-
cluding the nascent dilemma of living in communities
that enjoy less political pull,8 2 as well as often being
categorized as selfish "not in my backyard" activists, or
as "hysterical and irrational . . . greedy publicity-
seekers."8 3  However, studies indicate that environ-
mental justice is advanced furthest when community
residents not only enjoy a greater level of participation,
79. See Stella M. Capek, The "Environmental Justice"
Frame: A Conceptual Discussion and an Application, 40 Soc.
PROBLEMS 5, 8 (1993) ('The dimensions of environmental justice are
unified by a strong emphasis on citizenship rights, democratic pro-
cess, and respect for 'grass-roots' knowledge . .
80. See Kaswan, supra note 33, at 404.
8 1. See infra Appendix A, at Principle 7.
82. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental
Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement, in CONFRONTING
ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 31, at 15, 21-22.
83. Capek, supra note 79, at 7.
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but when that participation is legitimized and actually
influences the outcome.8 4
In the end, greater political justice for environmental
justice communities means that the residents of those
communities become more influential players in the en-
vironmental decision-making process - the process be-
comes more democratic.8 5 As Professor Kaswan writes,
"The touchstone for, political justice, is that decision
makers treat all citizens with 'equal concern and re-
spect.' Understood in its political sense, this form of
justice looks at the fairness of the decision-making pro-
cess rather than the fairness of its outcome."8 6
3. Self-Determination and Sovereignty
Closely linked to environmental justice's need for par-
ticipation - and legitimization of that participation - is
the movement's advocacy of self-determination. To be
sure, legitimate participation and fair representation in
the political system are the precursors to self-
determination, but true self-determination moves be-
84. See Davies, supra note 32, at 322; Gauna, supra note
33, at 72 (contending that public participation is a key element of
environmental justice, but that the movement's goals are defeated
when the participation is ignored); Edward Walsh et al., Backyards,
NIMBYs, and Incinerator Sitings: Implications for Social Movement
Theory, 40 Soc. PROBLEMS 23, 33 (1993). Increased public partici-
pation may also increase the quality of the decision-making proc-
ess, and subsequently, the project about which the decision was
made. See Ortwin Renn et al., Public Participation in Decision
Making: A Three-Step Procedure, 26 POLY ScI. 189, 205-08 (1993)
(providing a theoretical framework for improved public participa-
tion); Robert A. Rubin & Bettina Carbajal-Quintas, Environmental
Regulation and Public Participation in Project Planning, 121 J. PROF.
ISSUES ENG'G EDUC. & PRAC. 183, 184 (1995) ("Time, money, and
effort can be saved if an open and participatory atmosphere is es-
tablished.").
85. See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in
UNEQUAL PROTECTION, supra note 38, at 3, 11; see John O'Connor,
The Promise of Environmental Democracy, in ToxIc STRUGGLES, su-
pra note 22, at 47, 47-57.
86. Kaswan, supra note 33, at 402 (citations omitted).
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yond participation and representation alone. As the
Principles of Environmental Justice state, "Environmental
justice affirms the fundamental right to political, eco-
nomic, cultural and environmental self-determination of
all peoples."87 In other words, the movement strives to
give all citizens means by which to determine and influ-
ence the environment where they live. Without such
means, community residents are left to rely on others
for environmental protection; with such means, how-
ever, residents are empowered to help achieve true envi-
ronmental justice, and they become accountable for any
injustice they allow. In this sense, self-determination is
akin to the sovereignty sought after by American Indian
tribes88 - self-governance within each community's own
cultural and historical interface.8 9
87. See infra Appendix A, at Principle 5.
88. See id. at Principle 11.
89. Of course, Indian nations on the North American conti-
nent enjoyed sovereignty prior to Columbus' landing in 1492 and
the subsequent European colonization of America. Many tribes
still enjoy some extent of sovereignty due to treaties with the
United States. See COHEN, supra note 17, at 232-57. However,
these treaties have been construed by the Supreme Court to be
waivable by Congress, see, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat.) 543 (1823), although today such an occurrence is essen-
tially a political impossibility. On the other hand, some environ-
mental statutes now seek to further tribal sovereignty. The Clean
Water Act, for instance, allows tribes to be "treated as states,"
which in turn means that tribes may enact National Pollution Dis-
charge Elimination System Programs, Water Quality Standards,
and Wetlands Protection Programs. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1998).
This is important because state water quality standards can be
more stringent than federal standards, and they are enforceable
upstream. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1998); see City of Albuquerque v.
Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 421-23 (10th Cir. 1996). But regardless of
the extent to which tribes still possess sovereignty, at least one
commentator has argued that tribes would be better off environ-
mentally if they had a fuller measure of self-governance. See La-
Duke, supra note 31, at 98- 106.
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4. Home as the Environment: Local Control and Sense
of Place
Self-governance for communities ties intimately into a
final theoretical facet of environmental justice. Perhaps
the greatest contribution from women to the enviroh-
mental justice movement was the expansion of the .no-
tion of "environment" to include home.90 This expansion
helped to de-pigeonhole many environmental problems
from other disciplines,9' and furthered the idea that
communities, humans, other species, industry, and
ecosystems are interconnected and influence each
other.92 As Professors Collin and Harris point out, envi-
ronmental justice recognizes that "[n]o part of a com-
munity is an island unto itself; all residents benefit or
suffer when any of them do."9 3 Moreover, including
home and the workplace among the definition of envi-
ronment means that the scope of the movement is
broader and includes the interests of more citizens,
namely the working class and minority stay-at-home
parents. Perhaps most importantly, considering home
as part of the environment ties together all aspects of
the environmental justice movement: home is the place
most central to people's lives, and the place where par-
ticipation, self-governance, and environmental protec-
tion matter the most.
II. THE SUPREME COURT, THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND INTERSTATE WASTE
The Commerce Clause grants Congress "the Power...
[tlo regulate Commerce . . .among the several states."94
90. See Verchick, supra note 39, at 30, 47.
91. An example of this is the environmental justice move-
ment's considering lead poisoning as an environmental, rather
than public health, problem. See id. at 47.
92. See infra Appendix A, at Principle 1.
93. Collin & Harris, supra note 31, at 100.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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This power is clear and without qualification, but in
between the words written by the Framers, the Supreme
Court has long seen a corollary doctrine deemed the
"negative" or "dormant" aspect of the Commerce Clause.
This Dormant Commerce Clause restricts states from
economically discriminating against other states - un-
less Congress empowers them to do so. As the Court
wrote in H.P. Hood& Sons, Inc. v. DuMond:
This principle that our economic unit is the Nation,
which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to
control the economy, including the vital power of
erecting customs barriers against foreign competi-
tion, has its corollary that the states are not separa-
ble economic units . . . . [Wihat is ultimate is the
principle that one state in its dealings with another
may not place itself in a position of economic isola-
tion. 95
In. exercising this Dormant Commerce Clause, the
Court typically cites two justifications for the doctrine,
both of which are intimated in the H.P. Hood & Sons
quotation. First, the Dormant Commerce Clause en-
sures an efficient and free interstate trade market. Sec-
ond, the doctrine protects residents from burdensome
laws about which they have no vote. 96
Although these justifications may very well be the
stuff out of which good policy is made, and although
there may be some historical reasons for inferring the
95. 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
96. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 270-71 (13th ed. 1997); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 408-13, 436-38 (2d ed. 1988); Daniel A. Farber
& Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-
Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401,
1406-07 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 3. CONST. COMMENTARY 395, 396 (1986). In in-
terstate waste Dormant Commerce Clause cases, however, the
Court typically focuses on economic protectionism concerns. See
infra Parts II.A-II.C.
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doctrine, 97 even the Supreme Court itself recognizes the
Dormant Commerce Clause as a theoretical shroud the
Justices sewed from whole cloth. As Justice O'Connor
recently wrote, 'The scope of the Dormant Commerce
Clause is a judicial creation."9 8 Regardless, the Court
seems unlikely to overrule the doctrine, and Justice
Scalia has gone so far as to say that the Dormant Com-
merce Clause has "adversely possessed" the judicial,
landscape. 99
The seminal Dormant Commerce Clause case involv-
ing interstate waste, Philadelphia v. New Jersey,1oo typi-
fies the Supreme Court's stance on such cases in both
result and analysis. The Court repeatedly strikes down
the laws, and in doing so, applies a two part test to de-
termine the law's validity. If the law affecting interstate
waste bears economic protectionism justifications, then
the legislation "is virtually per se invalid." 101 On the
other hand, if the legislation is not discriminatory and
affects interstate commerce only incidentally, the law
falls under the so-called Pike test and is valid unless
"the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly ex-
cessive in relation to the putative local benefits."10 2
What follows is a discussion of the Court's five Dor-
mant Commerce Clause cases that have restricted
states from controlling the flow of interstate waste into
their jurisdictions. Collectively, these cases deny states
three legislative measures by which they could have
97. See TlE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 42
(James Madison); James Madison, Vices of the Political System of
the United States, in WRITINGS 362-63 (G. Hunt ed. 1901).
98. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York,
511 U.S. 383, 401 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue,
438 U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
100. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
101. Oregon Waste-Systems, Inc. v. Dep't of Environmental
Quality of the State of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); see Phila-
delphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
102. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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more stringently controlled disposal of imported waste
within their states: import bans, discriminatory sur-
charges, and flow control laws. 03 While these cases
differ in the types of laws they invalidate, they are uni-
fied by the Court's underlying reasoning, an inquiry for-
ever focused on economic protectionism, free markets,
and political representation - an examination that long
ago accepted the. analogies from which the Dormant
Commerce Clause was drawn, and never looks back to
again decide whether the doctrine exists at all except in
the minds of the Justices.
A. Import Bans
Import bans provide the most direct means to avoid
disposal of interstate waste within a jurisdiction. These
limitations allow states to preserve landfill space by pre-
venting waste from other states to enter their borders.
Moreover, Import bans facilitate local planning of needs
for disposal, and may reduce community resistance to
siting of new disposal facilities. 04 However, the direct-
ness of import bans also most clearly raises the specter
of discrimination against other states, and as such,
most easily invokes the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny
test.
1. Philadelphia v. New Jersey
In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court
struck down a New Jersey law prohibiting importation of
"any solid or liquid waste [that] originated or was col-
lected outside [New Jersey] . . . ."105 The Court began
its analysis by summarily concluding that waste is an
103. See Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in
Solid Waste: Trade-offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protec-
tion, and State Autonomy, 73 N.C. L. REv. 1481, 1496-1500 (1995).
104. See id. at 1498.
105. 437 U.S. at 618-19 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:11-
(West Supp. 1978)).
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object of commerce, 10 6 and then continued by examining
the intent of the law. Acknowledging that the New Jer-
sey legislature enacted the law to cope with rapidly in-
creasing solid waste within the state and its accompa-
nying attributes such as environmental harm, landfill
scarcity, and public health threats, the Court neverthe-
less concluded that "the evil of protectionism can reside
in legislative means as well as legislative ends."107 The
Court distinguished the New Jersey law from other
"quarantine" cases where the Court had found excep-
tions to the Dormant Commerce Clause. New Jersey's
law did not qualify here, because trash must not be dis-
posed as soon as possible, while the objects in the other
quarantine cases "by their very movement risked conta-
gion and other evils."108 Having found the New Jersey
law outside the quarantine exception - and having ac-
knowledged the discriminatory effects of the law - the
Court concluded that "on its face and in its plain effect"
the law was invalid. 109
Dissenting vigorously, Justice Rehnquist, who was
joined by Chief Justice Burger, explained the impor-
tance of the New Jersey statute. Pointing to the nega-
tive environmental effects of solid waste, Justice
Rehnquist contended that states must be empowered to
protect against these effects. 110 He argued that the ma-
jority's interpretation of the quarantine exception cases
was ill-founded, noting that transporting- not just
landfilling - solid waste creates potential health haz-
ards.1" Justice Rehnquist concluded:
The fact that New Jersey has left its landfill sites
open for domestic waste does not, of course, mean
that solid waste is not innately harmful. Nor does it
106. See id. at 621-23.
107. Id. at 626.
108. Id. at 628-29.
109. Id. at 626-27.
110. See id. at 630.
111. See id. at 632.
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mean that New Jersey prohibits importation of solid
waste for reasons other than the health and safety of
its population. New Jersey must out of sheer neces-
sity treat and dispose of its solid waste in some
fashion, just as it must treat New Jersey cattle suf-
fering from hoof-and-mouth disease. It does not fol-
low that New Jersey must, under the Commerce
Clause, accept solid waste or diseased cattle from
outside its borders and thereby exacerbate its prob-
lems. 1 1 2
2. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc.
Despite Chief Justice Burger's and Justice
Rehnquist's objections, the Supreme Court extended its
Philadelphia v. New Jersey reasoning fourteen years
later in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Department of Natural Resources.113 At issue in Fort
Gratiot was a Michigan law that disallowed counties
from landfiling waste generated outside their borders
unless they received approval from their county Solid
Waste Planning Committee to do so. St. Clair County
petitioned to receive permission to dispose of non-St.
Clair waste, but the county committee denied their ap-
plication. Unable to process out-of-county waste, a lo-
cal disposal company challenged the law.114
In a 7-2 decision, the Court invalidated the Michigan
statute, finding that as did the law at issue in Philadel-
phia, the statute discriminated against out-of-state
waste producers. Pointing out that the county disposal
restrictions were added to the Michigan statute subse-
quent to enactment of the main body of the law, which
the Court found to advance its goals for public health
and safety concerns, the Court based its analysis on an
extension of the economic protectionism reasoning in
Philadelphia. Despite the fact that the law here focused
112. Id. at 633.
113. 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
114. See id. at 355-57.
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on counties rather than states, the statute's effects not
only discriminated against other states but also fettered
the national market. The Michigan statute:
authorize[d] each of the [sltate's 83 counties to iso-
late itself from the national economy. Indeed, unless
a county acts affirmatively to permit other waste to
enter its jurisdiction, the statute affords local waste
producers complete protection from competition from
out-of-state waste producers who seek to use local
waste disposal areas.1 15
The Court left open an alternative measure for control-
ling problems associated with solid waste disposal, such
as statutory limits on how much waste can be disposed
yearly by landfill operators, but that measure was not at
issue in the Michigan law. 116
Again dissenting, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined this
time by Justice Blackmun, argued that the Michigan
statute advanced local environmental concerns, not
economic protectionism. Highlighting the intricate and
comprehensive nature of the statutory scheme, Chief
Justice Rehnquist elaborated:
If anything, the challenged regulation seems likely to
work to Michigan's economic disadvantage. This is
because, by limiting potential disposal volumes for
any particular site, various fixed costs will have to be
recovered across smaller volumes, increasing dis-
posal costs per unit for Michigan consumers. The
regulation also will require some Michigan counties.
• . to confront environmental and other risks they
have previously avoided. Commerce Clause con-
cerns are at their nadir when a state Act works in
this fashion - raising prices for all the Isitate's con-
sumers, and working to the substantial disadvantage
of other segments of the [sitate's population.1 17
I5. Id. at 361.
116. See id. at 367.
117. Id. at 370.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that the
statute should be remanded for consideration under the
Pike test, rather than being subjected to strict scrutiny
as it had originally been.
B. Discriminatory Surcharges
Discriminatory surcharges on waste imported to states
generally serve two purposes: if set high enough, they
may act as a substitute for an import ban; and when set
according to the impacts created by the waste, they may
compensate a state for the costs of importing the
waste. 118 Regardless of their purpose, however, the Su-
preme Court has struck down both types of these stat-
utes.
1. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt
In Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,119 the
Court applied the Dormant Commerce Clause to invali-
date an Alabama law that imposed a $72 per ton dis-
posal fee on hazardous waste generated outside Ala-
bama, but not on hazardous waste generated inside the
state. Despite the fact that nearly ninety percent of
hazardous waste disposed within Alabama was from
other states, the Court found that the law did not serve
to compensate the state for the additional costs of dis-
posing out-of-state toxic material within Alabama. In-
stead, the Court held that the law's "additional fee fa-
cially discriminates against hazardous waste generated
in [sitates other than Alabama, and the Act overall has
plainly discouraged the full operation of petitioner's...
facility."-120
The Court rejected the argument that the disposal fee
served any legitimate local interest, because it saw no
118. See Engel, supra note 103, at 1498.
119. 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
120. Id. at 342.
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evidence that hazardous waste generated outside Ala-
bama was any more dangerous than such waste origi-
nating within the state. 121 The majority dismissed the
claim that the Alabama law fell under the quarantine
exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 122 and re-
butted Alabama's contention that a disposal fee for both
in-state and out-of-state hazardous waste would provide
a disincentive to Alabama for dealing with its own prob-
lems, because the fee would encourage Alabama to ex-
port its own hazardous waste to other states. 123 Noting
that Alabama had valid, less discriminatory options
available for regulating hazardous waste - such as a
generally applicable per-ton disposal fee, a per-mile tax
on all vehicles transporting hazardous waste within the
state, and caps on total tonnage allowances at disposal
sites 24 - the Court concluded that Alabama's law was
unconstitutional: "Such burdensome taxes imposed on
interstate commerce alone are generally forbidden ....
Once a state tax is found to discriminate against out-of-
state commerce,' it is typically struck down without
further inquiry." 25
Dissenting alone, Chief Justice Rehnquist contended
that the commodity at stake was not hazardous waste,
but a clean and safe environment. From this perspec-
tive, the Chief Justice argued that it was not Alabama
isolating itself from the national economy. Rather, the
thirty-four states "that have no hazardous waste facility
whatsoever, not to mention the remaining [fifteen sitates
121. See id. at 343-44.
122. See id. at 346-47.
123. See id. at 346 n.8.
124. See id. at 344-45.
125. Id. at 342. This language may indicate that the Court
has shifted from a true strict scrutiny analysis, which establishes a
presumption that may be overcome, to a "per se invalid" stan-
dard- one that is lethal upon application. See supra note 101 and
accompanying text; GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 96, at 276-81.
Because the Court refers to the Philadelphia test as one of strict
scrutiny, however, I do also throughout this Note, even though
"lethal scrutiny" seems more accurate in its description.
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with facilities all smaller" than Alabama's, were the eco-
nomic isolationists. 126 As such, Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained that a tax discouraging the consumption of a
scarce resource such as a state's clean environment
would be constitutional. 127
2. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc.
In a second case overturning a discriminatory sur-
charge statute, the Supreme Court extended its analysis
from Chemical Waste Management and held that states
may not charge different disposal rates for In-state and
out-of-state waste, even if the rate differences are based
on cost calculations demonstrating taxes and adminis-
trative fees paid by in-state but not by out-of-state cor-
porations. In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department
of Environmental Quality of Oregon,128 the Court Invali-
dated an Oregon law that charged $0.85 per ton for in-
state waste, but $2.25 per ton for out-of-state waste.
The Oregon legislature had based the additional portion
of the out-of-state waste on an amalgamation of factors,
including statewide activities for reducing environ-
mental risks of and improving solid waste management,
reimbursing the state for tax credits and other public
subsidies, costs for waste reduction and recycling plans,
increased environmental liability, lost disposal capacity,
infrastructure costs, and nuisance costs from trans-
portation. 29  Regardless, the Court found "Oregon's
compensatory aim to be foreclosed by our
precedents."130 Citing the Chemical Waste Management
holding that intent of a law carries no weight when the
law bears economic protectionist motivations or effects,
the Court held that "[in making [a] geographic distinc-
126. 504 U.S. at 350.
127. See id. at 349.
128. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
129. Id. at 109 n. 1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 100.
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tion, the surcharge patently discriminates against Inter-
state commerce." 131 Accordingly, the Court found It "ob-
vious" that the Oregon statute was "discriminatory on
its face."132
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, and Justice
Blackmun again joined him. The dissent criticized the
majority's "myopic focus on 'differential fees,'" pointing
out that without the additional fees, state income taxes
and landfill operation tolls subsidized disposal of out-of-
state waste. 133 Rather than presenting economic pro-
tectionist interests, the dissent argued that the addi-
tional surcharge was, as Oregon contended, a fair com-
pensation for the subsidies out-of-state waste producers
received. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
Oregon solid waste producers do not compete with
out-of-state businesses in the sale of solid waste...
If anything, striking down the fees works to the
disadvantage of Oregon businesses. They alone will
have to pay the 'nondisposal' fees associated with
solid waste: landfill siting, landfill cleanup, insur-
ance to cover environmental accidents, and trans-
portation improvement costs associated with out-of-
state waste being shipped into the [s] tate. 134
C. Flow Control Laws
In its most recent Dormant Commerce Clause case,
the Supreme Court struck down a final type of waste
import restriction utilized by states. 135 Flow control
laws act effectively in the opposite way import bans do.
Rather than blocking all waste from entering the state,
131. Id.
132. Id. at 99.
133. Id. at 110.
134. Id. at 112.
135. But see Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 334-35
(1905) (upholding what was essentially a flow control ordinance);
California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S.
306, 325 (1905) (same).
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flow control laws require all waste generated within a
locality to be processed, transferred, treated, or dis-
posed at a designated facility. 136 This requirement gives
towns the ability to raise money according to the
amount of trash processed at their facility. Localities
can then use this cash for purposes such as building a
recycling or disposal facility, or for advancing waste re-
duction or education initiatives.
In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown,137 the Court
struck down a New York locality's flow control ordinance
that required all trash to be separated into recyclable
and non-recyclable waste at a transfer station for an
$81 per ton tipping fee before leaving the municipality.
A local recycling company that received waste from
other areas - and separated the waste at its own facil-
ity - challenged the law, contending that the tipping fee
was discriminatory. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy held that:
[while the immediate effect of the ordinance is to di-
rect local transport of solid waste to a designated site
within the local jurisdiction, its economic effects are
interstate in reach .... By requiring Carbone to
send the nonrecyclable portion of [its] waste to the..
. transfer station at an additional cost, the flow con-
trol ordinance drives up the cost for out-of-state in-
terests .... 138
Justice Kennedy then analogized to a long list of Su-
preme Court cases that had invalidated ordinances fa-
voring local businesses. 39 Finding one distinction in
136. See Engel, supra note 103, at 1499-1500.
137. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
138. Id. at 389.
139. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82 (1984) (Alaska timber); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970) (Arizona cantaloupe); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,
340 U.S. 349 (1951) (Madison, Wisconsin milk); Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948) (South Carolina shrimp); Johnson v. Haydel,
278 U.S. 16 (1928) (Louisiana oysters); Foster-Fountain Packing
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the ordinance at hand from the Court's previous prece-
dent - that the ordinance favored a single company
rather than an entire town's businesses - Justice Ken-
nedy concluded that "this difference just makes the
protectionist effect of the ordinance more acute."140
Writing in concurrence, Justice O'Connor disagreed
that the flow control law was discriminatory; she In-
stead felt it placed an excessive burden on interstate
commerce. 141 Arguing that because all waste generated
within the town's borders had to pass through the
transport station, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the
ordinance "'discriminates' evenhandedly against all po-
tential participants in the waste processing business." 42
Under this analysis, Clarkstown had advanced a legiti-
mate interest in ensuring the financial viability of its
transfer station, but this interest was simply outweighed
by its effect on interstate commerce: it "squelche[d]
competition," and could have been accomplished by
narrower means.
143
In dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun, objected to the ma-
jority's "greatly extending the [Commerce] Clause's dor-
mant reach."144 The dissent highlighted the notion that
the flow control ordinance was not discriminatory be-
cause it affected in-town and out-of-town waste disposal
companies in the same way, and then distinguished the
ordinance from the cases to which Justice Kennedy had
analogized. First, the Clarkstown ordinance favored a
single business, not an entire town. Second, this busi-
ness was acting essentially as a government agent, en-
suring waste removal according to local policy goals. 145
Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (Louisiana shrimp); Minnesota v.
Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) (Minnesota meat).
140. 511 U.S. at 392.
141. See id. at 401.
142. Id. at 404.
143. Id. at 405-06.
144. Id. at 411.
145. See id. at 416.
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From these differences, the dissent drew its conclusion:
"while these differences may underscore the ordinance's
anticompetitive effect, they substantially mitigate any
protectionist effect, for subjecting out-of-town investors
and facilities to the same constraints as local ones is
not economic protectionism." 146
III. TRADITIONAL CRITIQUES OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE
From Chief Justice Rehnquist's collection of dissents
alone, one might gather that the Dormant Commerce
Clause has not gone without criticism. Indeed it has
not. From its very inception, the Dormant Commerce
Clause has suffered - yet survived (at least in the Su-
preme Court's eyes) - an onslaught of disapproval and
discontent from scholars, practitioners, and the judici-
ary alike. 147 In fact, some of the Clause's most stinging
criticism has come from the pens of the Justices. For
instance, in a partial concurrence and partial dissent,
Justice Scalia wrote:
146. Id. at 418.
147. See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of
Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 265 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("IT~o the extent that [the Court has] gone be-
yond guarding against rank discrimination against citizens of other
[sltates ... the Court for over a century has engaged in an enter-
prise that it has been unable to justify by textual support or even
coherent nontextual theory, that it was almost certainly not in-
tended to undertake, and that it has not undertaken very well.");
Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91
YALE L.J. 425, 427-28, 484-85 (1982); Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10-17 (1975); Robert A. Sedler, The Negative
Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation:
An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV.
885, 998-1000 (1985): see generally Earl M. Maltz, How Much
Regulation Is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Ju-
risprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47 (1981); James M. O'Fallon,
The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Comment, 61 OR. L. REV. 395
(1982); Mark V. Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125.
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The fact is that in the 114 years since the doctrine of
the negative Commerce Clause was formally adopted
as holding of this Court, and in the 50 years prior to
that in which it was alluded to in various dicta of the
Court, our applications of the doctrine have, not to
put too fine a point on the matter, made no sense. 148
Even a majority decision employing the doctrine has
called it a "quagmire." 49
From these piercing words the Dormant Commerce
Clause has gained a tainted reputation at best, and the
shine of New Jersey's imported waste at worst, among
the legal rank and file. Yet with steadfastness and an
apparently tightening grip, 150 the Court continues to ap-
ply the Clause. Interestingly, critics of the doctrine do
not object to the political goal of economic union behind
the Dormant Commerce Clause, but they do object -
vehemently - on other grounds. The remainder of this
Part lays out the traditional critiques of the Dormant
Commerce Clause in general, and specifically, its appli-
cation to interstate waste. 151 The following Part presents
a new critique of the doctrine from the perspective of
environmental justice. 152
A. Constitutional Critiques
Many commentators criticize the Dormant Commerce
Clause for its lack of foundation in, and effects on, the
148. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Reve-
nue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-60 (1987) (citations omitted).
149. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minne-
sota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959).
150. The extension of the Philadelphia "lethal scrutiny" test
to statutes not facially discriminatory is perhaps the best example
of the Dormant Commerce Clause's tightening grip.
151. Notice that many of these critiques ring familiar with
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissents. This Part of the Note, however,
serves not to supercede or ignore the Chief Justice's arguments,
but rather to lay out a comprehensive framework of the shortcom-
ings of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
152. See infra Part IV.
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Constitution. For their relevance and acuteness, these
critiques are perhaps the most forceful of any; they cut
to the core of where the Court claims the Dormant
Commerce Clause has its roots, and they demonstrate
just how extra-constitutional the doctrine really is.
While other critiques must emphasize the shortcomings
of the doctrine itself, or fight its policy with their policy,
constitutional critiques assert the ghastliest claim of all:
that the Dormant Commerce Clause has no basis in the
Constitution, and in any event, that it harms the docu-
ment from which it supposedly comes.
1. Lack of Textual Foundation
Perhaps the most obvious - yet also most glaring -
criticism of the Dormant Commerce Clause is apparent
in the "dormant" or "negative" aspect of the doctrine. In
short, the Clause has no foundation in the text of the
Constitution. Plainly, the Constitution delegates the
power to regulate interstate commerce to Congress, not
to the Court or the President. 15 3 As Justice Scalia wrote,
"On its face, [the Commerce Clause] is a charter for
Congress, not the courts, to ensure 'an area of trade free
from interference by the [sltates. '" 154
Despite this clear delegation of power, the Court infers
from the Constitution a duty to enforce its own brand of
economic regulation when Congress is silent in the area
of interstate commerce legislation. This interpretation,
however, does not mesh with the framework in which
the Commerce Clause sits.155 If the Commerce Clause
153. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3.
154. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Reve-
nue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
155. See Michael DeBow, Codifying the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 1995 PUB. INT. L. REV. 69, 72-75; Martin H. Redish &
Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitu-
tional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 582-87; Amy M.
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granted Congress exclusive and sole power to regulate
interstate economic activity, then the Court would be
acting in its proper role by filling Congressional silence
with the Dormant Commerce Clause noise. However,
the Commerce Clause merely grants Congress the power
to regulate interstate commerce when - and if - it
chooses. 5 6 Its failure to do so has no single plausible
meaning. Congressional inaction may just as well rep-
resent a conscious choice not to legislate as it may a
legislative oversight. When there "is no reciprocal power
granted to the judiciary to invalidate burdensome state
legislation in the absence of congressional action,"157 the
Court is acting through a doctrine that has no founda-
tion in the words memorialized by the Framers.
2. Lack of Historical Foundation
While the Court has cited to The Federalist Papers as
historical support for the Framers' intent for a Dormant
Commerce Clause - and thus a solidified economic
union 5 8 - it is not clear that this evidence is as strong
as the Court might suggest. In fact, the historical sup-
port for the Dormant Commerce Clause is at best mixed,
and at times, both proponents and opponents of the
doctrine cite to the same evidence. For instance, both
sides claim that James Madison's statement in an 1829
letter to a friend that the Commerce Clause was "in-
tended as a negative and preventive provision against
injustice among the [sitates themselves, rather than as
a power to be used for the positive purposes of the Gen-
eral Government, in which alone, however, the remedial
Petragnani, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last
Leg, 57 ALB. L. REv. 1215, 1237-43 (1994).
156. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 155, at 583-84; Pe-
tragnani, supra note 155, at 1238-39.
157. Petragnani, supra note 155, at 1238.
158. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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power could be lodged." 159 Depending on one's inter-
pretation of "General Government," President Madison's
statement could favor either side. 160 If "General Gov-
ernment" means the judiciary, the Dormant Commerce
Clause seems to have a historical foundation in this
statement. But if "General Government" means the
legislature, the statement seems to favor eradication of
the Dormant Commerce Clause. Moreover, other his-
torical statements indicate that the Dormant Commerce
Clause should not exist at all: "[t]he powers reserved to
the several States will extend to all the objects, which,
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, lib-
erties and properties of the people; and the internal or-
der, improvement, and posterity of the State."161 In the
end, historical statements such as these seem to pro-
vide just as much fodder for debate as they do in shed-
ding light on the Framers' intent. 62
Indeed, at least one commentator has argued that due
to the unclear nature of the historical evidence, the ac-
tual text of the Constitution is the only reliable source
for interpreting the Commerce Clause. 163 This is even
more so when the breadth of the historical evidence is
considered; the Commerce Clause was mentioned only
159. Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional
Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 43, 55 (1988) (quoting Letter from James
Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 4 LETTERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 14, 15 (1867)).
160. See Christopher C. Faille, Is the Dormant Commerce
Clause Doctrine Zigging or Zagging?, 42 FED. LAw. 34, 37-38 (1995).
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 236 (James Madison) (Gary
Willis ed., 1982).
162. Perhaps this is unsurprising when we remember that
The Federalist Papers were written to convince both types of oppo-
nents to the Constitution- those afraid of a central government
and those afraid the union would be too weak- that it framed an
acceptable form of government. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS vi-xii
(Gary Willis ed., 1982).
163. See Petragnani, supra note 155, at 1241.
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nine times during the Constitutional Convention. 164 Re-
gardless, even assuming arguendo that there is strong
historical support for the Dormant Commerce Clause
because of the Framers' fear for "economic Balkaniza-
tion," such a fear seems to carry little weight in today's
modern, industrialized, international economy. As Pro-
fessor Eule explains:
The time-honored rationales for traditional dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence have become his-
torical vestiges. Because the Constitution does not
protect free trade or a national market, the Court's
current role as the trumpeter of these values can
only be viewed as that of congressional spokesman.
In 1789 Congress needed this crutch. Congress can
now fend for itself.165
3. Displacing the Constitution's Balance of Power
A third constitutional critique of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause expands in type on the contextual critique
presented by the lack of historical evidence. Rather
than focusing on a lack of textual or historical evidence,
these critics emphasize that the Dormant Commerce
Clause upsets the balance of power created by the Con-
stitution. Specifically, the Framers designed the Con-
stitution with checks and balances on each branch of
the government, giving Congress, the judiciary, and the
President specific - and limited -- powers. 166 This was
done with an intent to disallow any one of the branches,
especially the executive, to run headlong over the rest of
the government. 167 However, the Court's creation of the
164. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Consti-
tutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L.
REV. 432, 470 (1941).
165. Eule, supra note 147, at 435.
166. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47-51 (James Madison).
167. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 233 (James Madison)
(Gary Willis ed., 1982) ("Was then the American revolution effected,
was the American confederacy formed, was the precious blood of
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Dormant Commerce Clause upsets this balance, be-
cause it grants to the judiciary a power not given to it by
the Constitution. 168 As Professor McGinley summarized,
"the Court's view of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause cannot easily be squared with its own
exercise of judicial power [that] is said to flow from the
Identical textual source."169
Although it is insult enough that the Dormant Com-
merce Clause fundamentally changes the balance of
governmental power created by the Constitution, the
problem is exacerbated in at least two ways. First, since
1937 the Court has expanded Congress' power to regu-
late under the actual Commerce Clause. °70 In light of
thousands spilt . . . [that] the impious doctrine in the old world,
that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people ... be
revived in... a different form?").
168. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 155, at 588-90.
169. Patrick C. McGinley, Trashing the Constitution: Judicial
Activism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Federalism Man-
tra, 71 OR. L. REV. 409, 423 (1992).
170. Prior to 1937, the Commerce Clause did not give Con-
gress the power to regulate any economic activity that occurred
entirely within a state's borders. But in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court upheld a law because it
regulated an article that had an effect on interstate commerce.
This reasoning was extended five years later in Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), a case that upheld one of President Roose-
velt's New Deal statutes, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court overturned an interstate
commerce law for the first time since the late 1930s. In United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court invalidated a fed-
eral law that criminalized possessing a firearm within 1000 feet of a
school. Although some might see this as a signal that Congress'
power under the Commerce Clause is about to make a swing on the
pendulum, the Court unanimously upheld a RICO conviction be-
cause a drug trafficker running an Alaskan gold mine involved "in-
terstate commerce." United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669
(1995) (per curiam).
For criticisms of the Court's expansion of Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause, see, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA 158 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, The Mistakes of 1937,
GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 5, 7-12 (1988); Rchard A. Epstein, The
Proper Scope of Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1987); see
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this expansion in Congressional authority, it seems
strange that the judiciary would try to counter-balance
that expansion by vesting in itself a newfound power,
rather than simply limiting Congress' abilities to those
expressly bestowed by the Constitution. In other words,
"[tihere is something fundamentally wrong with a judi-
cial framework that prompts judicial intervention by the
same trigger that induces political response."171
A second exacerbating factor is that the doctrine's
shift in balance of power toward the judiciary is subse-
quently skewed by the high hurdles one must overcome
to spur on Congressional action. While it is difficult
enough for Congress to pass laws on its own volition,172
the legislature seems even less likely to act on issues
the Supreme Court specifically draws to its attention. 173
This reluctance on Congress' part to overrule the Su-
preme Court only adds to the already-skewed power the
Court has given itself under the Dormant Commerce
Clause.
4. Upsetting the Constitution's Balance of Federalism
The final constitutional critique traditionally waged
against the Dormant Commerce Clause is that the doc-
trine upsets the Constitution's balance of power vested
in the states and the federal government. A central de-
bate over the ratification of the Constitution was how
governmental power would be divided between the fed-
eral government and the state governments. 174 The
resolution to this controversy was achieved by giving the
generally Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative
State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
171. Eule, supra note 147, at 436.
172. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
173. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 155, at 593; Petrag-
nani, supra note 155, at 1247-48.
174. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS.
39, 44, 45, 46 (James Madison).
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federal government limited and specifically defined pow-
ers, while leaving for the states only residual power to
govern through the universe of powers not granted to
Congress and the President. 175  As James Madison
wrote, "the States will retain, under the proposed Con-
stitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty.
"176
Yet the Dormant Commerce Clause acts to fastidiously
erode the residual governance of the states. By giving
the federal government a power not explicitly granted to
it by the Constitution, the doctrine fundamentally be-
trays the compromise of federalism reached by the
Framers. 177 Indeed, the Framers' balance of federalism
in the area of commerce seems quite clear, for the Con-
stitution not only grants Congress the power to regulate
interstate commerce but also limits the states' power to
do so: the states may not coin money, "emit Bills of
Credit," pass laws impairing contractual obligations,
and, without the consent of Congress, excise duties on
imports or exports.17 8
But even under an assumption that the Constitution
grants an exclusive authority of commerce regulation to
the legislature, the Dormant Commerce Clause still vio-
lates the constitutional balance of federalism. Under
this assumption, which has been termed "dual federal-
175. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 236 (James Madison)
(Gary Willis ed., 1982) ("The powers delegated by the proposed
Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous
and indefinite.").
176. Id. at 233; see also THE FEDERAuST No. 9, at 41 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Gary Willis ed., 1982) ("The proposed Constitu-
tion... leaves in [the states'] possession certain exclusive and very
important portions of sovereign power.").
177. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 155, at 584-85; Pe-
tragnani, supra note 155, at 1246-47; see also McGinley, supra
note 169, at 419-23 (noting the mysteriously concurrent rise of the
Dormant Commerce Clause and federal common law).
178. U.S. CONST. arts. I, § 10, cls. 1-3; IV, § 2.
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ism," 179 states could not exercise at all a power given to
the central government, and vice versa. However, cur-
rent Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is con-
trary to this theory of "dual federalism," for it allows
states to regulate interstate commerce so long as such
regulation does not violate federal law nor evoke dis-
crimination against other states.180 In addition, Con-
gress could not delegate power to regulate interstate
commerce to the states,' 8' even though the text of the
Commerce Clause would seem to allow it.i 8 2 Regardless,
"dual federalism" is not the accepted theory of our Con-
stitution. 8 3
B. Critiques of the Dormant Commerce Clause's
Application
While the traditional constitutional critiques may
seem ruinous enough for the Dormant Commerce
Clause - at least theoretically - another set of cri-
tiques attack the doctrine from an entirely different per-
spective. Rather than pointing out the doctrine's lack of
constitutional heritage, these critiques fault the Court
for employing a confusing and unpredictable doctrine.
1. A Doctrine Confused and Unpredictable: Havoc for
Lower Courts
The first critique of the Dormant Commerce Clause's
application is that it is impossible to draw from it any
coherent and consistent theoretical framework. Indeed,
179. Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36
VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950).
180. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 155, at 584.
181. See id.
182. Cf Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408
(1946)(holding that Congress may constitutionally consent to state
legislation that impinges on interstate commerce).
183. See Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State
Court 'Federal' Decisions: A Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA.
L. REV. 861, 882-88 (1985).
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
modem constitutional law texts all seem to have their
own take on the issue, analyzing the doctrine in their
own, rather different ways. 8 4 The doctrine is also un-
predictable. Take for instance the interstate waste
cases. 185 The Court for the first time announced that
strict scrutiny would apply to laws that have discrimi-
natory ends rather than means in Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 86 and then applied that strict scrutiny to invali-
date a statute that regulated Michigan's counties in Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill.8 7 Likewise, in Oregon Waste
Systems, the Court overturned a type of statute it had
previously intimated might be constitutional in Chemical
Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt.188 Indeed, the only
clear trend in the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence seems to be that despite the many rea-
sons to abandon the doctrine, the Justices are on a
mission to relentlessly expand its reach.
Besides being theoretically faulty for its unwieldy ap-
plication, the doctrine's confused and unpredictable op-
eration also creates the unfortunate consequence of
confusing the lower courts. 189 This confusion in the
lower ranks only compounds the matter. Courts that
cannot make sense out of the Supreme Court's Dormant
Commerce Clause opinions end up issuing incoherent
184. See e.g. WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTIT-
UTIONAL LAw 251-338 (10th ed. 1997); GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra
note 96, at 270-328; see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 284-302 (5th ed. 1995); TRIBE, supra
note 96, at 413-36.
185. See supra Part II.
186. See supra Part II.A. 1.
187. See supra Part II.A.2.
188. See supra Part II.B.
189. For an article devoted solely to explaining the doc-
trine's lamentable effect on the lower courts, see Stanley E. Cox,
Garbage In, Garbage Out: Court Confusion about the Dormant Can-
merce Clause, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 155 (1997).
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and inconsistent decisions of their own.190 Such confu-
sion on the trial and appellate, state and federal, levels
gives attorneys little surety in any counsel they might
provide their clients, and leaves states and localities
wondering what interstate commerce lawsuit lurks in
waiting. As Professor Lawrence stated:
The nub of the matter is that the Court's current ap-
proach to dormant-commerce-clause cases is so
scattered that nobody - not state legislators, not
law students, not the academic authorities, not the
lower courts, nor, indeed, the Court itself - knows
clearly what the Court's rules are concerning the
Dormant Commerce Clause. 191
2. Swallowing the Dormant Commerce Clause Whole:
Exceptions to the Doctrine
A second criticism of the Dormant Commerce Clause's
application builds on the first. These commentators
point out that not only is the doctrine confusing, but it
also might not even exist. Specifically, exceptions the
Court has chiseled out of the doctrine, such as the
"market participant" exception, carve so much of the
doctrine away that the Court might as well not even
employ it. Under the so-called "market participant" ex-
ception, localities that participate in a specified eco-
nomic sector may explicitly discriminate against other
states in favor of their own citizens. 192 In the context of
waste disposal, localities acting under the "market par-
ticipant" exception could construct landfills and affect
190. See Lisa J. Petricone, Comment, The Dormant Com-
merce Clause: A Sensible Standard of Review, 27 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 443, 450-51 (1987).
191. Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant
Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. PoLY 395, 415 (1998).
192. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794 (1976) (Maryland state-owned abandoned car reprocessing);
see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake. 447 U.S. 429 (1980) ( South Dakota
state-owned cement manufacturer).
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blatant import bans - constitutionally. One commen-
tator has noted a rise in use of the "market participant"
loophole by localities eliciting exactly such import bans,
arguing that the exception has been so abused that the
Dormant Commerce Clause is meaningless. 193 Indeed, it
follows that states might use other exceptions to the
Dormant Commerce Clause to specifically invoke eco-
nomic effects that the Court's decisions otherwise bar. 194
3. Judges Not Economists: The Court's Faulty
Economics
A final critique of how the Dormant Commerce Clause
has been applied attacks the Court's economic
analysis. 195 The Court since Philadelphia, however, has
193. See Edward W. Greason, Garbage and the Constitution:
Solid Waste Disposal, the Dormant Commerce Clause and the Mcr-
ket Participant Exception, 3 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 1 (1991); see
generally Dan T. Coenen, State User Fees and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 50 VAND. L. REv. 795 (1997) (pointing out the tension
and potential contradiction between the market participant excep-
tion and state user-fee cases).
194. Although unlikely to apply to interstate waste cases, an
example of another exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause is
a state's police power. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City
of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (upholding a city smoke ordinance
that affected interstate ships on the grounds that cities are entitled
to protect their citizens' health).
195. Actually, scholars have criticized the Dormant Com-
merce Clause's application in one other respect. Some commenta-
tors argue that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act allows
flow-control ordinances. See Michael D. Diederich, Jr., Does Gar-
bage Have Standing?: Democracy, Flow Control and a Principled
Constitutional Approach to Municipal Solid Waste Management, 11
PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 157, 187-97 (1993): Brian M. Brown & Amy P.
Lund, Comment, Flow Control Ordinances Under the Dormant Can-
merce Clause: Unconstitutional Restraint on Commerce?, 5 U. BALT.
J. ENVTL. L. 92, 101-02 (1995); Ann R. Mesnikoff, Note, Disposing of
the Dormant Commerce Clause Barrier: Keeping Waste at Home, 76
MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1246 (1992). However, at least one Justice
frowned on this argument in C & A Carbone, Inc., and the majority
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rejected these arguments. Some commentators con-
tinue to insist, in the same vein as Chief Justice
Rehnquist, that garbage simply is not commerce. 196
Under this analysis, trash does not fall under the reach
of the Dormant Commerce Clause for two reasons.
First, by its very definition, waste is not bought and
sold; rather, communities must pay companies to take it
away. Second, waste is not interstate commerce until it
actually reaches other states; communities that locally
dispose the waste they locally create have not entered
that waste into the stream of commerce, so statutes
such as flow-control laws should be constitutional. 19 7
A second argument against the Supreme Court's eco-
nomic theory under the Dormant Commerce Clause
contends that the Court's assumptions underlying its
free-market approach are not always correct. Instead,
under a game theory analysis, 198 actually allowing dis-
decision seemed to ignore it. See 511 U.S. 383, 407-10 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. See Diederich, supra note 195, at 208-10: see generally
Stanley E. Cox, Burying Misconceptions About Trash and Commerce:
Why It Is Time to Dump Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 20 CAP. U. L.
REV. 813 (1991).
197. See Diederich, supra note 195, at 209-10 (analogizing
to Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), a case where the Supreme
Court allowed local control over raisins, 95% of which eventually
entered interstate markets, based on the distinction that the rai-
sins had not yet entered interstate commerce).
198. Game theory analyzes problems by placing the deci-
sion-makers in a framework where they seek to maximize their own
net benefits, but do so by guessing what the other decision-maker
will decide.
In the classic example, a "prisoner's dilemma," two co-
conspirators are interrogated separately. If they both remain silent
as to guilt, the 'Joint net gain is greatest. Both receive minimal
sentences. If one decision-maker pins the blame on the other, and
the other remains silent, their net benefits are mixed. One prisoner
is released and the other is sentenced. And if both pin the blame
on the other, their net benefits are lowest. Both serve time in jail.
Clearly, the mutually silent option is the best from an aggregate
perspective. But the greatest individual rewards lie in pinning the
blame on the other decisionmaker. This inevitably leads to a result
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
crimination between states may be what maximizes the
nation's economic good. For instance, Philadelphia v.
New Jersey places states in a prisoner's dilemma game.
In this dilemma, "both states will refuse to site a land-
fill, even though that strategy yield[s] a worse joint out-
come. Solid waste will be either undisposed or unsafely
disposed."199 If both states site landfills, then each state
accounts for a portion of the waste, driving the aggre-
gate costs of disposal, which includes transportation
and potential environmental harms, down. 200 As Profes-
sor McGreal explains, "[Tihe Court's prevailing dormant
Commerce Clause antidiscrimination test takes the neo-
classical economic view, assuming states do not act
strategically. [A game theory analysis], however, show[s]
that states will act strategically in some cases, under-
mining the Court's neoclassical economic
assumption."201 This means that not only might the
Court's economics be faulty, but also they might even be
faulty in trying to achieve the goal for which the Court
claims it aims.
Finally, the Court's economic principles have been
criticized for being too narrow in their analysis. Specifi-
cally, a number of commentators point out that the
where both pin the blame on the other, individually they both re-
ceive punishment, and in the aggregate, the net benefits are the
lowest.
The type of analysis used in the "prisoner's dilemma" game is
currently employed in numerous academic disciplines, including
economics, biology, and law. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994); JOHN R. KREBS & NICHOLAS B.
DAVIES, BEHAVIOURAL ECOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (4th ed.
1997); DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING
(1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (5th ed.
1998); MARK SEIDENFELD, MICROECONOMIC PREDICATES TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS (1996); Bobbi S. Low, Men, Women, and Sustainability,
18 POPULATION & ENV'T 111 (1996).
199. Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191, 1278 (1998).
200. See id. at 1245-79.
201. Id. at 1279.
2571999]
258 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
Court's analysis under the Dormant Commerce Clause
focuses only on the easily-seen, actual monetary bene-
fits and costs for interstate waste garbage
corporations. 202 Although useful as a starting point, a
true economic analysis cannot end there. Instead, a full
economic accounting cannot be complete until it in-
cludes benefits and costs external to garbage compa-
nies: health and environmental risks; safety and traffic
costs; risk of future potential financial responsibility for
cleanup; and depreciated housing prices or community
reputation. If the Court were to include these factors in
its economic analysis, what laws might pass under the
Dormant Commerce Clause could very well change from
the list of acceptable laws today.203
C. Policy-Based Critiques
The final set of traditional critiques of the Dormant
Commerce Clause is often the most contemporarily
compelling, but at the same time lacks the level of logi-
cal force evinced by many of the constitutional critiques.
Indeed, these policy-based critiques offer convincing
reasons why the Dormant Commerce Clause must fail,
but do so by combating the Court's politics with their
own. On one level this may seem to undercut the effec-
tiveness of these critiques, for they lack the historical
and textual support the other critiques enjoy. But from
another perspective, there seems no reason why the
Court's political preferences should not be overcome by
other policies, or why the economic flames of a judicial
construction cannot be drowned by the waters of eco-
nomic tenets conflicting with the Court's, or the need for
202. See James E. Breitenbucher, Yakety Yak, Take Your
Garbage Back: Do States Have Any Protection from Becoming the
Dumping Grounds for Out-of-State Municipal Solid Waste?, 52 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 225, 251-53 (1997); see also Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2395-96 (1996).
203. See Breitenbucher, supra note 202, at 252.
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environmental, health, and safety measures. Moreover,
these policy-based critiques seem particularly poignant
in light of the foregoing constitutional and application-
based criticisms, which place the Dormant Commerce
Clause's moorings in an extremely tentative position.
1. Environmental, Health, and Safety Policy
Throughout his dissents, Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
minds us of the importance of advancing environmental
and health protection, and how the Dormant Commerce
Clause robs states of some methods by which they may
provide that same protection. A corollary to the Chief
Justice's argument is that the Dormant Commerce
Clause also produces potential environmental and
health harms of its own. Indeed, the doctrine does not
necessarily increase the amount of waste disposed in
the United States, but it does increase the distance the
waste travels. 204 With this increase in distance travel
comes increased risks of spills, contamination, and
other environmental concerns. 205  Moreover, moving
waste greater distances also means elevated safety
risks, as the chance for automobile accidents is greater
the farther the waste must travel, and increased move-
ment of heavy waste trucks will slowly but inevitably
degrade interstate highways.
Additional environmental criticisms of the Dormant
Commerce Clause include the doctrine's ignorance of
the idea of risk multiplication. For instance, in Chemi-
cal Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, the Court failed to
204. Currently, some American waste travels as far as from
Nevada to Pennsylvania, from New Jersey to Texas, and from Con-
necticut to Illinois. See, e.g., Edward W. Repa, Interstate Movement
1995 Update, WASTE AGE, June 1997, at 42, 46. The state of
Washington also imports waste from Alaska, Hawaii, and Antarc-
tica. See id.
205. See Bruce H. Aber, Note, State Regulation of Out-of-
State Garbage Subject to Dormant Commerce Clause Review and the
Market Participant Exception, I FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 99, 115
(1989).
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recognize that Alabama residents near the facility at is-
sue now face approximately nine times greater chance of
being harmed as they did prior to the Court's decision,
because only ten percent of the waste disposed at the
plant was produced in-state. 20 6 Moreover, the actual
risk Alabama residents may now face - the extent of
the harm as opposed to the chance of the harm - is
also greater, because more waste is processed at that
facility.
Finally, the Dormant Commerce Clause fails on envi-
ronmental tenets, because it nullifies many state efforts
to affirmatively address the municipal waste problem.
Indeed, laws such as the flow-control measure at issue
in Carbone facilitate local waste reduction and recycling
programs by ensuring that' a set percentage of all waste
produced in that area will end up in more beneficial
places than a landfill. By invalidating such laws, the
Court not only ignores environmental problems associ-
ated with waste transport, but also curtly turns its head
away from the problems associated with the waste
itself.207
2. Alternate Economic Policy: A "Freer" Market than the
Court's
Although the argument could be made, it seems un-
likely that a country working for so long under a gener-
ally free-market system would be convinced that the
Dormant Commerce Clause should die at the hand of
other economic philosophies such as socialism. 20 8 There
206. See Janet Cornwall Panacoast & Leonidas W. Payne,
Comment, Hazardous Waste in Interstate Commerce: The Triumph of
Law over Logic, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 817, 846-47 (1993).
207. See C.M.A. McCaulliff, The Environment Held in Trust
for Future Generations or the Dormant Commerce Clause Held Hcs-
tage to the Invisible Hand of the Market?, 40 VILL. L. REv. 645, 682-
84 (1995).
208. This seems especially unlikely in light of the domino-
like demise of the Soviet bloc, along with an increasingly free-
market Communist China.
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is, however, an argument why the Dormant Commerce
Clause might be overturned for the brand of free-market
economics it promulgates. While the Court contends
that the Dormant Commerce Clause only advances an
open market for all Americans, at the same time it ig-
nores the fact that the United States government di-
rectly and indirectly regulates multiple facets of the
economy. Consequently, it seems odd that the Court
would strive to minimize additional regulation by the
states, especially when it allows them to regulate the
economy in many other ways. Moreover, the Dormant
Commerce Clause does not effect the same principles of
fair play it proclaims. Instead, "the Supreme Court's
application of strict scrutiny [under the doctrine] bene-
fit[s] states that have shirked their disposal responsibil-
ity, while punishing those states that have taken re-
sponsibility for disposal."2 9 In light of the enormous
body of federal law and regulation in the environmental
area, which in turn influences the national economy,
such a result created by the judicial pen seems insin-
cere at best, if not fundamentally flawed.
IV. ANOTHER BULLET HOLE IN THE SUPREME COURT'S
DOCTRINE: AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE
OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Dormant Commerce Clause has been criticized by
many commentators and shot at from almost every an-
gle. From a constitutional vantage, the doctrine seems
to have little foundation; an analysis of its application
reveals its convoluted and apparently contradictory
nature, along with its potentially incorrect economic
analysis; and there are strong policy currents that run
against the Clause. This Part proposes, however, that
209. Panacoast & Payne, supra note 206, at 847; see Stan-
ley E. Cox, What May States Do about Out-of-State Waste in Light of
Recent Supreme Court Decisions Applying the Dormant Commerce
Clause? Kentucky as Case Study in the Waste Wars, 83 KY. L.J.
551, 559-62 (1995).
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there is at least one more bullet hole to be shot in the
Supreme Court's doctrine. Following the theoretical
foundation laid in Part I.C, this environmental justice
critique reveals that the Court's interstate waste juris-
prudence violates almost every tenet the movement ad-
vances, and at times dumps interstate waste dispropor-
tionately on people of color and lower income. While a
law enacted by Congress delivering such results would
at minimum present a reason to question facets of our
policymaking processes, the same effect delivered at the
hand of nine life-tenured, non-elected judges seems un-
democratic, if not unjust.
A. Distributional Justice
By its mere presence, a landfill presents numerous
environmental and health risks to the communities to
which it is closest. Perhaps most palatably, landfills are
associated with increases in everyday annoyances such
as noise, smells, traffic, and rat populations. 210 Unfor-
tunately, the impacts of landfills do not end there.
Many landfills receive toxic and hazardous wastes as a
part of their municipal waste stream. 211 Households
that put common materials such as batteries, cleaning
materials, fluorescent light bulbs, thermometers, paint
thinners, or pesticides out on the curb every Tuesday
night for pickup the next morning are sending hazard-
ous waste to landfills. 212 These toxics often leak from
the landfills, subsequently migrating into aquifers and
drinking water supplies.213 Indeed, nearly twenty per-
cent of the nation's most toxic Superfund sites are for-
210. See Robert R.M. Verchick, The Commerce Clause, Envi-
ronmental Justice, and the Interstate Garbage Wars, 70 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1239, 1247 (1997).
211. See WILLIAM RATHJE & CULLEN MURPHY, RUBBISH! THE
ARCHEOLOGY OF GARBAGE 76 (1992).
212. See Engel, supra note 103, at 1488.
213. At least two-thirds of operating landfills are currently
unlined. See RATHJE & MURPHY, supra note 211, at 88.
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mer landfills. 214  Moreover, some landfills generate
methane gas, which can also migrate offsite and create
health or fire hazards. 215
Communities near landfills are at greater risk of these
environmental and health dangers than are communi-
ties farther away from the sites. 216 Likewise, communi-
ties that export their waste do so at their environmental
advantage, and at another community's environmental
disadvantage. While in some areas the data is mixed,
there is a clear overall indication that from a distribu-
tional justice viewpoint, the Dormant Commerce Clause,
by allowing states to export their waste to other states,
disproportionately burdens the poor, and perhaps mi-
norities as well.
1. Pollution and Environmental Harms
One study previously examined the distributional ef-
fects of interstate waste movement. In Reconsidering
the National Market in Solid Waste,217 Professor Engel
analyzed the data presented in Interstate Movement of
Municipal Solid Waste - 1992 UPDATE.218 From her
state-based analysis, Professor Engel concluded that the
Dormant Commerce Clause's allowance of essentially
unfettered interstate waste markets runs counter to the
environmental justice movement's goals in three ways.
First, waste moves from more densely populated states
to more rural states. This may be a fairly predictable
outcome given that landfills require land, but the differ-
214. See Engel, supra note 103, at 1489.
215. See Verchick, supra note 210, at 1247 (citing an exam-
ple of a five-foot pillar of fire touched off by a cigarette smoker at a
Steve Winwood concert at Shoreline Amphitheater in Mountain
View, California, a concert venue built on top of an old landfill).
216. See Cox, supra note 209, at 556-58.
217. Engel, supra note 103.
218. Edward Repa, Interstate Movement of Municipal Solid
Waste- 1992 UPDATE, WASTE AGE, Jan. 1994, at 37.
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ence is pronounced: net-importing states have ap-
proximately 173 people per square mile less than net-
exporting states.219 In addition, interstate waste also
moves from cleaner states to states that are already
more polluted before they receive the waste. Indeed,
net-importing states suffer both greater air pollution (13
million pounds per year more) and greater water pollu-
tion (2.65 million pounds per year more) than net-
exporting states.220 This is especially significant given
the fact that net-importing states have lower population
densities. Finally, interstate waste moves from richer to
poorer states. In fact, net-importing states maintain a
per capita income that is $1,170 less than that of net-
exporting states.221 Professor Engel also reported that
net-importing states suffer a higher poverty rate than
net-exporting states, but that difference was not statis-
tically significant. 222
However, Professor Engel's analysis also revealed one
way interstate waste does not comport with what envi-
ronmental justice advocates would normally expect. On
a state level, interstate waste moves to states with sig-
nificantly lower percentage of minorities than the states
exporting the waste. Specifically, net-importing states
had three percentage points less minorities than net-
exporting states.223 This finding indicates, at least on a
state level, that the Dormant Commerce Clause does not
disproportionately burden minorities. Rather, the
Clause's distributionally unjust effects are correlated
only with population density, already-existing environ-
mental degradation, and income levels.
Professor Engel's article was the first to study inter-
state waste from an environmental justice perspective,
and its insights are extremely useful. Indeed, her
219. See Engel, supra note 103, at 1493-94.
220. See id. at 1494, 1562.
221. See id. at 1562.
222. See id. at 1494.
223. See id. at 1494-95.
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analysis reveals that on a state level the Dormant Com-
merce Clause bears all the distributionally unjust ef-
fects the environmental justice movement would expect
it to, excluding a correlation with minority populations.
However, Professor Engel's analysis does not address
the other tenets of the environmental justice movement,
nor does it consider the interstate movement of waste
on a narrower basis than the state level. While an
analysis tracking interstate waste shipments from
neighborhood-to-neighborhood or census-tract-to-
census-tract would be ideal, 224 such a study is not cur-
rently possible.225 There are, however, some states that
track their waste imported from other states on a
county level. The remainder of this sub-Part analyzes
this data for the four highest net-importing states 226 for
which the county-specific data is available: Pennsylva-
nia, Virginia, Michigan, and Ohio. While varying by
state, this analysis reveals that at least for some states,
the waste imported from other states is disproportion-
ately dumped on counties with statistically significant
higher levels of minority residents and poverty rates.
224. A more narrow analysis is superior to a geographically-
broader one, because a state with a low minority population, for
instance, may import all of its waste Into an area occupied by pre-
dominantly poor and minority residents.
225. The movement of interstate waste is geographically far-
reaching, often inter-company, and sometimes difficult to track.
Edward Repa's publications in the magazine Waste Age are the
most reliable and comprehensive source of the data. See Repa,
supra notes 204, 218. However, when I recently spoke with Mr.
Repa, he informed me that the more specific data underlying his
publications is largely confidential and thus unavailable to the
public. Telephone Interview with Edward W. Repa, Director, Envi-
ronmental Industries Association (Feb. 17, 1999).
226. In 1995, the ten highest net-importing states were, In
order, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Michigan, Kansas, Indiana, Oregon,
Ohio, Texas, New Hampshire, and South Carolina. See Repa, su-
pra note 204, at 52. 1 was able to obtain county-specific data for
Pennsylvania, Virginia, Michigan, Ohio, and Illinois. Illinois is the
eleventh biggest net-importing state. See id.
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Out-of-state waste and county racial makeup. While
interstate waste may travel to states that generally have
lower minority populations than the states exporting the
waste, what happens to the waste once it enters a state
is not as clear. In two of the four states analyzed, the
majority of the imported waste is eventually landfilled in
counties with significantly higher minority populations
than the rest of the state. In Virginia, this means that
1,966,714 tons of waste were deposited in counties with
minority populations higher than the state's, and only
833,287 tons of imported waste were deposited in coun-
ties with minority populations equal to or less than the
state's.227 Likewise, in Ohio, 835,279 tons of imported
waste were landfilled in counties with more minorities
than the state in general, while just 546,224 tons were
disposed in counties with minority levels less than or
equal to the state's. 228
Virginia: MSW Imports and Race
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1500000
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227. See infra Appendix E.
228. See infra Appendix C.
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Ohio: MSW Imports and Race
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In contrast to Virginia and Ohio, waste imported to
Pennsylvania and Michigan went primarily to counties
with minority levels equal to or less than their respective
state levels. This trend was most pronounced in Penn-
sylvania, where 5,606,288 tons of waste were disposed
in counties with average or lower than normal minority
populations for the State, and only 767,279 tons were
disposed in counties with significantly higher minority
populations. 229 Michigan followed a trend similar to
Pennsylvania, although not as strikingly; 3,459,333
tons of imported waste were disposed in counties with
minority populations typical of or lower than average for
the State, and 2,276,054 tons were disposed in signifi-
cantly high minority counties. 230
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RaceC
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229. See infra Appendix D.
230. See infra Appendix B.
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Michigan: MSW Imports and Race
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Although the trends in Virginia/Ohio and Pennsylva-
nia/Michigan diverge, they are nevertheless important
under an environmental justice analysis. Indeed, the
Virginia and Ohio data indicate that there are at least
some states where interstate waste disproportionately
harms racial minorities. While this might not be the
case in every state, this finding at least partially contra-
dicts the notion that interstate waste is free of racially
correlated harm. In this light, the Dormant Commerce
Clause takes on an increasingly dim hue for states such
as Virginia and Ohio. Not only does the doctrine pre-
vent the states from protecting their citizens from im-
ported waste, but it also prevents them from doing so
for a portion of their residents who already bear the
brunt of our society's environmental harms. Moreover,
it is possible that if all the net-importing states had
county-specific data available, then what happens to
interstate waste once it enters a state may become the
more important Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
And importantly, an analysis based on waste volume
alone is forever skewed toward Pennsylvania's demogra-
phy,23 1 because that state imports nearly four times
more waste a year than the next largest net-importer,
231. At least this is the case as long as Pennsylvania im-
ports so much more waste than the other states.
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Virginia.23 2 But if a majority of net-importing states'
waste imports follow the same disposal pattern as Vir-
ginia's and Ohio's, then the Dormant Commerce Clause
would begin to fade from the dim to the dismal, a doc-
trine robbing citizens of protections and working against
even many federal initiatives. 233
Out-of-state waste and county poverty levels. Profes-
sor Engel's analysis revealed that waste moves from
states with higher per capita incomes to states with
lower per capita incomes, and possibly from states with
lower poverty levels to states with higher poverty levels.
A county-specific analysis, however, exposes trends
similar to the county-specific racial trends.
In Virginia and Ohio, the majority of imported waste is
disposed in counties with statistically significant higher
levels of poverty than the state. For Virginia this means
that 1,969,945 tons of waste were disposed in high pov-
erty counties, while 830,056 tons were disposed in
counties with average or lower than average poverty
rates.234 Likewise, 917,078 tons of imported waste were
landfilled in Ohio counties with significantly high pov-
erty rates, and only 464,425 tons were deposited in
counties with poverty levels equal to or lower than the
state level. 235
232. See Repa, supra note 204, at 52. Importantly, how-
ever, Virginia's ratio of waste imported to exported (17:1) is much
higher than Pennsylvania's (8.4:1). See id.
233. This would certainly be the case for initiatives such as
President Clinton's Environmental Justice Executive Order, see
supra note 29 and accompanying text, the Clean Water Act's treat-
ment of tribes as states provision, see supra note 89, and possibly
for certain civil rights statutes.
234. See infra Appendix E.
235. See infra Appendix C.
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Likewise, waste imported into Pennsylvania and
Michigan follow remarkably similar trends in correlation
with poverty as with race. The majority of waste im-
ported into these states go to counties with poverty lev-
els equal to or lower than the state rates. In Pennsylva-
nia, the trend is again the most pronounced, and
5,692,188 tons of waste were disposed in counties with
poverty levels typical of or better than the state.23 6 Only
681,379 tons went to especially poverty-stricken coun-
ties.23 7 Furthermore, in Michigan, 3,358,440 tons of
imported waste went to typical or wealthier counties,
while 2,376,947 tons were landfilled in significantly im-
poverished counties.
236. See infra Appendix D.
237. See id.
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As they did with interstate waste and county racial
makeup, the conflicting trends in the county-specific
data for Virginia/Ohio and Pennsylvania/Michigan indi-
cate meaningful things about the Dormant Commerce
Clause as viewed under environmental justice theory.
We know from Professor Engel's analysis that interstate
waste moves from richer to poorer states, and we now
also know that waste sometimes additionally dispropor-
tionately impacts impoverished communities. While
this brief glance at county-specific data cannot provide
a complete picture of what happens to interstate waste
once it enters state boundaries, it indicates that in some
states imported waste presents additional environ-
mental justice concerns. Indeed, at least to some extent
this further taints the Dormant Commerce Clause, a ju-
dicially imposed judicial construction that for some
states disproportionately harms minorities and the poor.
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2. Natural Resources and Environmental Goods
The primary way landfills limit access to natural re-
sources is through opportunity costs. Siting of a landfill
in an area deprives that community of a chance to use
the land for greenspace or other similar purposes. This
deprivation is especially problematic when acreage
could have been used in a way that would provide the
poor or minorities actual access to natural resources,
such as parks or wilderness preserves. 238 Regardless,
greenspace often benefits an area by providing ecosys-
tem services, including air pollution reduction, water
purification, and in some circumstances, pest control.239
Moreover, problems associated with loss of greenspace
are only exacerbated by landfills' attendant environ-
mental degradation, particularly when landfills leak,
polluting the environment and thus diminishing that
community of other environmental goods such as clean
water or absence of hazardous waste sites. Finally,
landfills may deprive communities of environmental
goods in one other tangential way. By driving down real
estate prices, a landfill taints a community's environ-
mental reputation, thus minimizing the little potential
for mobility that lower income minority residents may
have initially possessed to move to a different area with
greater access to natural resources. 240
238. See Taylor, supra note 48, at 32-33 (explaining the
historical pattern in which minorities and the poor have not had
access to greenspace such as parks, especially in the urban con-
text).
239. See generally NATURE'S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE
ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen Daily ed., 1997). For discus-
sions on valuing ecosystem services, see Janet N. Abramovitz, Put-
ting a Value on Nature's "Free" Services, WORLD WATCH, Janu-
ary/February 1998, at 10; Graciela Chichlinsky & Geoffrey Heal,
Economic Returns from the Biosphere, 39 NATURE 629 (1998).
240. See A. Dan Tarlock, City Versus Countryside: Environ-
mental Equity in Context, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 461, 468, 477-91
(1994) (describing environmental inequities associated with Amer-
ica's car culture and the failure of urban redevelopment in relation
to increased immobility of minorities and the poor).
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Clearly, interstate waste does not deny actual access
to natural resources as, say, a toxic waste spill that
decimates a community's only wilderness area might.
Yet interstate waste movement does not help the matter
either. At its very best, the Dormant Commerce
Clause's unfettered market in interstate waste only adds
to the problem. States that are net-exporters of waste
enjoy the option to preserve their land for parks, nature
trails, or other refuges. States that import that waste,
on the other hand, concomitantly lose that option, ton
of garbage by ton of garbage. Additionally, states that
are forced by the Court's decisions to import waste also
reduce their capacity to dispose of their own waste.
This denial was advanced furthest by Carbone, as that
decision also negatively influenced municipalities' ability
to reduce and recycle their waste, environmental goods
in and of themselves.
Furthermore, because the Dormant Commerce
Clause's interstate waste travels from richer to poorer
states - and from less polluted states to more polluted
states - this reduction in access to natural resources
and other environmental goods also collides with envi-
ronmental justice's goal of distributional equity. Fur-
ther, in states such as Virginia and Ohio, where im-
ported waste moves primarily to minority and lower in-
come counties, the Dormant Commerce Clause seems to
completely fail under the eye of environmental justice.
3. Environmental Laws
Inasmuch as environmental laws are enforced less
vigorously for environmental dilemmas proximate to
poor and minority communities, 241 it seems to follow
that this problem would also be a concern for interstate
waste moved into poorer states, or poor and minority
counties. Indeed, approximately fifty percent of landfills
241. See supra Part I.C.I.
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operate without valid permits. 242 However, it seems un-
likely that the Dormant Commerce Clause's allowance of
waste movement does not present any environmental
justice concerns unique to interstate waste. Instead,
any potential distributional justice problems with envi-
ronmental law enforcement are only heightened in the
interstate waste arena to the extent that waste moves
into poorer or more minority-populated areas where the
enforcement is already lax.243 Because that waste does
move to poorer states - and in some instances, to the
poorest and most minority-populated counties within
those states - environmental law enforcement sur-
rounding interstate waste is, in fact, an environmental
justice concern, but just not one that presents evidence
unique to the interstate waste arena.
B. Political Justice
The Dormant Commerce Clause also works against
the environmental justice movement's goal of greater
political justice. The Court's decision in Philadelphia to
apply strict scrutiny to all interstate waste cases means
that democratically enacted laws serving important local
or regional interests such as environmental protection
will be struck down "with almost no regard for the local
242. See RATHJE & MURPHY, supra note 211, at 85.
243. The problem of states relaxing their environmental
laws in order to attract industry is typically referred' to as the "race
to the bottom." See generally Richard Revesz, Rethinking the "Race
to the Bottom," 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1993); Richard B. Stewart,
Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196
(1977). It is not clear, however, that such a race is an issue here,
as the Dormant Commerce Clause, not the states, guides the
regulations, and because racial makeup does not neatly correlate
with waste disposal. Indeed, races to the bottom are not always
the case. See generally Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental
Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It to the "Bottom"?, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997).
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needs or motivation behind them."244 Moreover, while
not all local or state laws always reflect the will of the
populace, restrictions on waste importing seem to carry
a greater chance that they were enacted to environ-
mentally protect localities rather than to harm them.245
Indeed, states that would ban importing waste would do
so to their own immediate economic disadvantage, a fact
that in itself seems to be enough of a check on economic
"balkanization." Similarly, even the statute at issue in
Oregon Waste Systems, a law that generated tax reve-
nues for the state, very well could have economically
disadvantaged the state by scaring away would-be waste
importers by imposing higher fees on their imports.
But perhaps the Court's grandest assault on environ-
mental justice's advancement of public participation
came in Fort Gratiot.246 In striking down a state law that
allowed counties to decide whether to import waste, the
Justices moved the decision-making process from the
immediate jurisdiction in which citizens live, vote, and
often work, to the chambers of the Supreme Court.
Indeed, an average citizen has much greater access to
a city council or county board of governors meeting than
to her senator on Capitol Hill, or a Justice on the Su-
preme Court for that matter. 247 A citizen's voice is also
louder in a town-hall-like meeting than in a letter sent
to a Congressman; by volume and quantity alone, one
person's participation in a local meeting is much less
likely to be drowned out by the flood of powerful lobby-
ists or their eloquently written handbills constantly pre-
244. Verchick, supra note 210, at 1302. Note, again, how-
ever, that even a true strict scrutiny analysis would take such fac-
tors into accounts- so long as the interests were "compelling."
But under what appears to be the Court's "lethal scrutiny" test,
even compelling interests do not protect state laws.
245. See id. at 1303 (citing SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47
F.3d 263, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1995)).
246. 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
247. See id.
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sent on the federal level. 248 In fact, by moving the deci-
sion-making process away from localities, the Court
further undercuts environmental justice's interest in
public participation by giving corporations a skewed
share in the participation market. Under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, corporate interests can lobby at the
state and local level unchecked by citizen groups now
restrained by the Court's doctrine, and when suffering
the unlikely loss, run to the federal judiciary for protec-
tion under the same Dormant Commerce Clause that
increased their lobbying power in the first place. 249 This
problem of diminished participation is only further
compounded when large corporations rather than
counties or municipalities also manage the landfills that
are importing the waste, as may often be the case for
importing landfills. In Virginia, for instance, six of the
nine facilities that accept out-of-state waste are either
owned or operated by private companies. 250
C. Self-Determination and Sovereignty
Environmental justice's advocacy for greater public
participation proceeds in lockstep with the movement's
advancement of greater self-determination and sover-
eignty. However, if the Dormant Commerce Clause hin-
ders public participation, it stifles self-determination.
For apart from participation, citizens are left largely to
turn to local or state governments for protection. This
is, in fact, by design, and under a logical construction of
the Constitution should not be feared. Indeed, states
248. Indeed, lobbying is so prevalent in Washington, D.C.,
that Congress recently passed a law requiring lobbyists, trade as-
sociations, and other certain classes of entities wielding lobbying
influence to report their lobbying expenses on a semiannual basis.
See Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1607 (Supp.
1998).
249. See Verchick, supra note 210, at 1303.
250. See VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
REPORT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 25-46 (1998).
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were left "numerous and indefinite" powers for the pur-
pose of protecting their citizens. 25 ' As James Madison
wrote,
The State Governments may be regarded as con-
stituent and essential parts of the federal Govern-
ment: whilst the latter is nowise essential to the op-
eration or organization of the former .... The num-
ber of individuals employed under the Constitution
of the United States will be much smaller than the
number employed under the particular States.
There will consequently be less of personal influence
on the side of the former than of the latter. 25 2
While Madison mis-aimed in his prediction of the extent
to which the federal government would grow, his state-
ment takes on even greater meaning in light of just how
extensive the federal government has become.
To be sure, the Dormant Commerce Clause's limits on
state sovereignty work against Madison's vision of the
Constitution, and to the chagrin of the environmental
justice movement. By upending complex state environ-
mental laws such as the one at issue in Fort Gratiot, the
Court limits states' ability to regulate environmental
harms, and in so doing, to protect their citizens. 25 3
Similarly, the Court's decision in Carbone restricted
state sovereignty that could be used to provide environ-
mental services, such as recycling programs, to local
citizens. Further, Philadelphia's strict scrutiny test not
only removes local interests from a public participation
arena, but also obliterates it from consideration for
251. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
252. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 234-35 (James Madison)
(Gary Willis ed., 1982).
253. See McCaulliff, supra note 207, at 683-84 ("The notion
of trusteeship and police powers acts as a corrective when we de-
part too far from the balance of competing values of individual
freedom and social controls, thus potentially endangering the val-
ues and culture of the American way of life that the Constitution is
designed to protect.").
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states seeking on their own initiative to protect their
citizens.
Finally, the Dormant Commerce Clause's hampering
of state sovereignty in environmental regulation is im-
portant for two additional reasons. First, federal envi-
ronmental laws typically set floors for protection, not
specific standards. 254 The Dormant Commerce Clause,
however, undercuts states' ability to heighten environ-
mental protection in the waste disposal arena.255 This
effect of the Dormant Commerce Clause is particularly
important to the environmental justice movement, for it
denies states the ability to become laboratories for pol-
icy experiments. 256 In addition, while the federal gov-
ernment continues to regulate more and more aspects of
the environment, 257 at the same time it relies on the
254. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. §6936 (1994) (allowing states to administer their own pro-
grams so long as the state program is equivalent to the federal pro-
gram); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994) (setting forth re-
quirements for "state implementation plans" under the act).
255. See Engel, supra note 103, at 1522-23.
256. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 40 (1978).
257. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenti-
cide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-1364 (1994); Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1994); Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield
Act, 16 U.S. C. §§ 528-531 (1994): Coastal Zone Management Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (1994); National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1600-1614 (1994); Forest and Rangeland Resources Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1994); Occupational Safety and Health Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994); Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994); Ocean Dumping Ban Act, 33 U.S.C. §§
1401-1445 (1994); Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761
(1994); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26
(1994); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361
(1994): Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992K (1994);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7462 (1994); Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994); Pollution Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-
13109 (1994); Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1784 (1994).
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states to implement those laws. 258 When Congress is
relying on state sovereignty to implement environmental
protections, and the Supreme Court is eroding that
autonomy, a double whammy for environmental justice
ensues: less state autonomy, less protection for minority
and lower income citizens, and less environmental pro-
tection overall.
D. Home as the Environment: Local Control and Sense of
Place
The environmental justice movement's idea of home as
the environment combines all tenets of the movement by
linking environmental protection, equity, participation,
self-determination, and explaining the interconnected-
ness of ecosystems to a sense of place. Embedded in
this multi-linked interconnectedness is the notion that
home is the space where your influence on the environ-
ment - and the environment's influence on you - can
be felt the greatest.259 From this vantage, the Dormant
Commerce Clause immediately founders.
In Fort Gratiot, for instance, the Court's invalidation of
the county-based statute created a fissure between
waste production and waste disposal. Rather than de-
ferring to Michigan's attempt to internalize the true
costs of waste production for each county, the Court
mixed the signals by allowing waste imports and the
attendant ability to export waste. Similarly, in Carbone,
the Court perpetrated another disconnection between
waste production and disposal. No longer may localities
force their residents to pay for the cost of separating all
258. See Engel, supra note 103, at 1523; see also, e.g.,
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (allowing Congress to
use its spending power to "commandeer" state governments).
259. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKET-
CHES HERE AND THERE 6 (1968) ("There are two spiritual dangers in
not owning a farm. One is the danger of supposing that breakfast
comes from the grocery, and the other that heat comes from the
furnace.").
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their garbage for recycling purposes. Instead, citizens
are free to cast their waste to the winds of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, which will then take it to a poorer
state, and possibly a lower-income, minority-populated
county within that state.
Indeed, the Court's decision to disallow true internali-
zation of waste production costs by county or by mu-
nicipality are important, because that decision means
that the incentives created by waste production are re-
moved from localities. Rather than cope with the prob-
lem themselves, localities may export their waste to
other states, creating an ignorance of the true impacts
of the community's waste production. 260 Moreover, the
Court's decisions ignore the fact that waste disposal has
been a local issue since the first prehistoric villages. 261
To remove that control from localities in the latter part
of the twentieth century is a curious decision, and one
that does not seem to comport with sensible environ-
mental regulation. In sum, having faltered under the
scrutiny of the first three tenets of environmental jus-
tice, the Dormant Commerce Clause steps up one last
time to the movement's critique and, again, fails.
V. THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CRITIQUE OF THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE APPLIED: A BRIEF CASE STUDY OF
VIRGINIA
In 1992, Virginia was the fifth largest net-importer of
waste in the United States. 26 2 In 1995, the Common-
wealth had "moved up" three slots in the rankings, sec-
ond only to Pennsylvania in its net amount of waste im-
ported from other states. 263 In 1992, Virginia imported
260. See Cox, supra note 209, at 559-62.
261. See RATHJE & MURPHY, supra note 211, at 9, 33-40.
262. See Engel, supra note 103, at 1563.
263. See Repa, supra note 204, at 52.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
1.5 million tons of municipal waste, 264 but by the end of
1998, the Commonwealth had imported 4.6 million tons
in the year, a 300% rise in just six years' time. 265
The increasing growth of Virginia's waste imports,
along with a report released in late 1998 by the Virginia
Department of Environmental Quality,266 caught the at-
tention of Virginia Governor James S. Gilmore III. The
Republican governor subsequently called for action in
the Commonwealth's General Assembly, and publicity
surrounding Virginia's campaign to fight waste imports
began to swirl. 267 Clearly, a time of political action was
approaching.
A. A Political Volley: Gilmore versus Giuliani
Nearly fifty-five percent of waste currently imported to
Virginia comes from. New York, and in December 1998,
New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani announced a new
waste disposal plan for his city in response to the im-
pending closure of the Fresh Kills landfill. 268 The plan
called for a larger portion of his New York City's waste to
be shipped to Virginia by barge, nearly 4000 tons per
day.26 9 Giuliani's proposal only heightened Governor
Gilmore's interest in protecting Virginia from out-of-
state waste, and in his State of the Commonwealth ad-
264. See Engel, supra note 103, at 1564.
265. See Craig Timberg, N.Y. Accused of Targeting Va. For
Trash: State Fights to Save Limits on Garbage, WASHINGTON POST,
July 14, 1999, at AI0.
266. VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrry, supra
note 250, at 32.
267. See, e.g., David W. Chen, Glow of New York Trash
Flickers in Virginia, N.Y. IMES, March 11, 1999, at Al.
268. See Paul H.B. Shin, Golden Trashes Plan for Fresh Kills
Landfill, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 17, 1998, at 2.
269. See Eric Lipton, Five States Challenge New York's
Trash Plan: Letter Says Amount Is "Unacceptable," WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 7, 1999, at C 1.
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dress on January 13, 1999, the governor vowed to bar
New York from barging its additional trash to Virginia.270
Angered, Giuliani responded that "People in Virginia
like to utilize New York because we're a cultural center.
We don't have the room to handle the garbage
that's produced not just by New Yorkers." 271 Giuliani
continued:
one of the helps we need from the rest of the country
is to assist us with a problem that arises from that
[distinction], which is that we produce a lot of gar-
bage. We don't do it because we're profligate. We
don't do it because we're wasteful. We do it because
there are a lot of people in the city and that brings
great benefit to the American people.
27 2
Governor Gilmore responded to Mayor Giuliani's
comments the next day in front of the press, chiding the
New Yorker for his myopic view:
New York City is a great city, but there's no equation
[between cultural amenities and trash]. There is no
relationship or obligation as a result of the excel-
lence of New York City. Anybody else in the entire
country, all the way from Maine to Florida to Califor-
nia, would be insulted by that type of approach.
27 3
One of Virginia's lawmakers, William T. Boiling, also got
in on the political volley, echoing Governor Gilmore's
message on the Virginia Senate floor. "We pay our
hard-earned money to buy goods at their shops, and
food in their restaurants. We spend our hard-earned
money to attend plays on Broadway. Yet, somehow we
270. See Jeremy Redmon & Stephen Dinan, New York's Gi-
uliani Talks Trash to Virginia: Tells Gilmore State Can't Refuse Ref-
use, WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 15, 1999, at Al.
271. Id.
272. Ledyard King, New York Mayor's Trash Talk Angers
Governor of Virginia, NORFOLK VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 15, 1999.
273. Id.
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have to reciprocate for those pleasures by accepting
their trash."274
Giuliani fired back one last time, apparently dismiss-
ing the Virginian rebuff. He stated:
There are more places that want to do business with
us than you could possibly imagine. I mean, every
time somebody makes these statements - some
politician trying to get on television - we get five
mayors and ten communities to call us and say:
"Don't listen to him, we need your business."2 75
In response to this statement, Gilmore mailed the New
York mayor a letter stating he was "offended," 276 and
then two weeks later signed Virginia on to a letter from
Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia
criticizing Giuliani's plan to export Its waste. 277 Gil-
more's comeback to Giuliani's statements, however, did
not end in mere words.
B. Political Bantering Turns to Law
Hardly one week after the dust had settled from the
Gilmore-Giuliani spat and the five-state letter had been
mailed to the New York mayor, the Virginia General As-
sembly swiftly put their pens where their governor's
mouth was. The Commonwealth's House and Senate
separately passed nearly identical waste disposal pack-
ages, addressing in large measure the concerns Gover-
nor Gilmore had quarreled over with Mayor Giuliani.
Together, the three bills - a cap on per day landfill dis-
posal, a ban on transport of waste over Virginia rivers,
and new monitoring and inspection programs for land-
274. Redmon & Dinan, supra note 270.
275. Tom Topousis, Rudy: Ignore Grouchy Gov- Va. Wants
Our Garbage, N.Y. POST, Jan. 19, 1999, at 21.
276. Id.
277. See Lipton, supra note 269; Va. Joins Four States in
Concern with N.Y. Trash: Giuliani's Plan Would Double Brooklyn's
Trash Output by 2001, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 8, 1999, at 3C.
2831999]
284 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
fills - sought to help limit the amount of out-of-state
waste entering Virginia each year to roughly the same
level of 1998.278
1. Dumping Caps
The new Virginia laws restrict waste landfilling in the
Commonwealth In two ways. First, the law requires that
new disposal facilities - and applications from existing
facilities for increases in their disposal capacity - may
not be granted until the Director of the Virginia De-
partment of Environmental Quality (DEQ) determines
that the new facility or facility expansion will protect:
present and future human health and safety and the
environment; [that] there is a need for the additional
disposal capacity; [that] there is sufficient infra-
structure . . . to handle the waste flow; [that the fa-
cility is consistent with local and state disposal lim-
its, and that the facility is in the public interest and
comports with regional and local waste plans]. 2 79
Further, new facilities may not be sited until the DEQ
holds a public hearing within the locality where the
landfill will be sited. 280
The second way the new Virginia statute regulates the
Commonwealth's waste disposal amounts is much more
direct; it imposes a 2000-ton per day cap on Virginia
landfills.281 While facilities that have consistently ac-
cepted more than 2000 tons of garbage on a daily basis
may receive more than 2000 tons per day under an ex-
ception in the law, they may not accept more waste than
278. Some Virginia politicians, however, were not entirely
pleased with a limit based on 1998 figures. See Rex Springston,
Delegate Trashes Gilmore Policy, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July 3,
1999, at B6 (noting that Kenneth R. Plum and A. Donald McEachin
felt the governor should focus on obtaining authorization from
Congress to enact more restrictive waste measures).
279. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1408.1(D)(1) (Michie 1999).
280. See id.
281. See id. at § 10.1-1408.3(A).
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the average daily amount they received during 1998.282
Facilities that have not consistently operated in the last
two years may also receive more than 2000 tons of
waste a day, but they may not in any circumstances ac-
cept more than 2400 tons per day.283
2. Bans on Waste Transport by River
In addition to the new waste disposal facility require-
ments, the newly enacted statutes also regulate the flow
of waste by barges, ships, and vessels. To ensure pro-
tection of Virginia's aquatic ecosystems, the law
strengthens the permitting requirements for transport of
waste by water, disallowing disposal facilities from ac-
cepting waste moved by water without first receiving a
permit to do so. 28 4 This provision also limits the way in
which garbage may be transported by barge; the con-
tainers holding the waste may not be stacked more than
two high.285
Virginia's new laws also include a more stringent
measure. Finding that the current provisions regulating
transport of waste by water "will not in all circum-
stances provide sufficient protection of [public] health,
safety and welfare or of the Commonwealth's atmos-
phere, lands, and waters," the new law bans movement
of hazardous and nonhazardous waste, along with
medical wastes, from being shipped via the Rappahan-
nock, James, and York Rivers.286 However, this provi-
sion creates exceptions for scrap metal, dredged mate-
rial, and source-separated recyclable materials. 287 Ad-
ditionally, the extent of the ban may be mitigated by a
qualifying clause that imposes the restriction only to the
extent allowed by the United States Constitution, and as
282. See id.
283. See id. at § 10.1-1408.3(D).
284. See id. at § 10.1-1454.1(B).
285. See id. at § 10.1-1454.1(A)(ii)(d).
286. See id. at § 10.1-1454.2.
287. See id.
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"necessary to protect [public] health, safety and welfare"
and Virginia's environment.28 8
3. Heightened Monitoring, Inspection, and Permit
Requirements
Finally, a third aspect of Virginia's new waste disposal
laws heightens regulation of landfill siting, monitoring,
and inspecting. For siting, the new law requires that
the disposal facility accommodate its locality. The site
must comply with the local or regional waste manage-
ment plan;289 reach a host agreement with the locality,
addressing at a minimum, issues of financial compen-
sation, traffic volume, daily disposal limits, and the an-
ticipated service area of the facility;290 and must provide
at least some room for the locality's waste. 291
In addition to the new requirements to accommodate
localities, the Director of the Department of Environ-
mental Quality may not issue new landfill permits with-
out first conducting a site feasibility study. These
studies must address traffic and highway safety impacts
of the facility, potential environmental impacts, and the
geological suitability of the site. 292 And when landfills
are closed down, the owners and operators of the site
must conduct monitoring and maintenance on the site
for at least six months to "protect human health and the
environment." 293 At the end of the six months, the DEQ
is authorized to extend the monitoring period if needed
to protect Virginians or their ecosystem.
The final provisions of the law are more general in
nature. The first provides a cleanup fund that extends
grants to local governments to remediate leaking land-
288. Id.
289. See id. at § 10.1-1408.1(B)(6).
290. See id. at § 10.1-1408.1(B)(7).
291. See id. at § 10.1-1408.1(P).
292. See id. at § 10.1-1408.1(D)(1).
293. Id. at § 10.1-1410.2(A)-(B).
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fills. 294 The other provision authorizes the DEQ to
promulgate regulations to ensure that trucks trans-
porting waste within the state satisfy minimum envi-
ronmental and safety controls.295
C. Waste Management's Challenge
On March 27, 1999, Governor Gilmore signed Vir-
ginia's new waste disposal legislation into law. How-
ever, before the package could take effect on its slated
date of July 1, 1999, Waste Management, Inc., the larg-
est waste disposal company in the world,296 filed a law-
suit challenging the law in the federal trial court for the
Eastern District of Virginia.297 Eventually joined by five
other plaintiffs - including three other waste disposal
companies and the County of Charles City, Virginia -
the action sought invalidation, and in the meantime a
temporary injunction, of the laws. 298
On June 30, 1999, district court Judge James
Spencer granted Waste Management's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, temporarily barring enforcement of
Virginia's waste disposal cap, the limit on container
stacking on barges, and the ban on waste transport over
the Rapahannock, James, and York Rivers. 299 In his
strongly worded memorandum opinion accompanying
issuance of the injunction, Judge Spencer concluded
that Virginia's new statutory provisions were "precisely
294. See id. at § 10.1-1413.2.
295. See id. at § 10.1-1454.3.
296. See Waste Management, Inc., About Waste Manage-
ment (visited July 29, 1999) <http://www.wm.com/category/sub/
1,1076,1 1,00.html>.
297. See Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, No.
3:99CV425 (E.D. Va. trial date pending).
298. See Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, No.
3:99CV425, mem. op. at 1-2 (E.D. Va. June 30, 1999) (accompa-
nying order granting preliminary injunction).
299. See Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, No.
3:99CV425 (E.D. Va. June 30, 1999) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
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what the [Dormant] Commerce Clause forbids."3 00 Fo-
cusing on the political landscape surrounding passage
of the legislation, Judge Spencer noted that "numerous
Virginia lawmakers and other state officials . . . fre-
quently couch[ed] their [support for the legislation] in
anti-out-of-state waste terms."30 1 The judge also noted
that the landfill cap and the river ban primarily influ-
enced out-of-state waste interests and not those of Vir-
ginia, because no Virginia landfill receiving only local
waste even neared the 2000-ton cap, and because only
minimal amounts of intra-state waste are transported
over Virginia's rivers. 30 2 The judge concluded that these
facts indicated clear discrimination in the laws' purpose
and effects, regardless of whether the "restrictions ...
appear, on their face, to be neutral .... "303
Having found Virginia's laws protectionist in nature,
Judge Spencer held that strict scrutiny applied, and as
such, the plaintiffs would "almost certainly ... succeed
on the merits."3 0 4 The judge rejected Virginia's argu-
ment that the laws were required for environmental
protection and as health and safety measures. In dis-
cussing this claim in relation to the barging bans, for
instance, he wrote, "Virginia clearly could address its
health, safety, and environmental concerns without to-
tally prohibiting the use of container barges for trans-
porting solid waste. Indeed, the General Assembly ap-
proved such legislation in 1998 .... "305 Having rejected
Virginia's contended reason for the laws' validity, the
Judge also dismissed a more general claim that the laws
300. See Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, No.
3:99CV425, mem. op. at 23 (E.D, Va. June 30, 1999).
301. Id. at 8, 18-20.
302. See id. at 4-6.
303. Id. at 14; see id. at 16, 17 ("[I]t is impossible to review
this record without concluding that the challenged provisions were
motivated by an undisguised animus against the importation of
out-of-state municipal solid waste.").
304. Id. at 23; see id. at 18-20.
305. Id. at 22.
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functioned in the public interest: "Such interstate
commercial warfare is clearly in no one's interest." 06
With Virginia's justifications rejected - and the laws
subject to strict scrutiny - the judge's determination
that plaintiffs' eventual success was likely meant that
an injunction was in order.
D. Critique of the Preliminary Injunction: Offending
Environmental Justice and More
Although Judge Spencer's memorandum opinion ac-
companying the preliminary injunction is clearly not a
final determination based on the merits, let alone a de-
cision that will necessarily be granted certiorari when
appealed to the Supreme Court,307 the vigor with which
he issued the injunction - along with his verbal com-
ments in doing so - indicates that Virginia's laws will
in fact be struck down when the full trial commences. 308
Indeed, at the hearing in which Judge Spencer granted
Waste Management's motion, he stated that "[tihe cases
are crystal clear ... in terms of what can be done and
can't be done in terms of inhibiting the free flow of
commerce."30 9 The judge further stated of the Virginia
laws, "[t]his is a classic example of what the [Dormant]
306. Id. at 23.
307. Governor Gilmore has vowed to fight to have Virginia's
laws implemented, even if that means taking it to the Supreme
Court. See Craig Timberg, War on Trash Isn't Over, Gilmore De-
clares, WASHINGTON POST, July 1, 1999, at B 1.
308. The trial date is currently set for December 14, 1999.
Telephone Interview with Stewart Leeth, Attorney, Virginia Office of
the Attorney General (July 28, 1999).
309. Craig Timberg, Va. Laws on Imports of Trash Blocked:
Judge Calls Limits Unconstitutional, WASHINGTON POST, June 30,
1999, at Al.
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Commerce Clause is designed to prevent - fifty bicker-
ing commercial islands unto themselves." 310
The injunction is not entirely surprising in light of the
path the Supreme Court has been trodding with its in-
terstate waste decisions. In fact, by definition, once
strict scrutiny applies, laws are "virtually per se invalid."
Judge Spencer's detection of discriminatory effects in
the Virginia statutes is also reminiscent of the Court's
determinations in prior Dormant Commerce Clause
cases, particularly Fort Gratiot and Carbone. From the
political record surrounding the laws' enactment, it is
fairly clear that at least some of the Virginian lawmak-
ers somewhat despised New York's waste. But despise
for an imported evil does not make discriminatory de-
sign for an entire General Assembly, and determining
legislative intent is a rather slippery endeavor in any
event. 311 Judge Spencer's injunction order also high-
lights just how lost the Supreme Court has left trial
courts in the quagmire of sleeping constitutional text: 312
uncertain what constitutes important local government
interests, ignorant of the crucial nature of state envi-
ronmental protections, and able only to stare into the
flames, searching desperately for some hint of "dis-
crimination" and its escape hatch out of the much
harder-to-apply Pike balancing test. Moreover, the in-
junction is also subject to the traditional constitutional,
application-based, and policy critiques of the Dormant
310. Larry O'Dell, Judge Issues Injunction Blocking Trash
Import Laws, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEwSwIRES, June 30, 1999, at
00:0 1:00 available in Westlaw, ALLLNEWS library.
311. See generally Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Com-
mon Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpreta-
tion: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1998) (analyzing the Supreme Court's 1996 term
statutory interpretation cases).
312. For an analysis of courts' recent attempts to navigate
the quagmire, see Jennifer M. Anglim, Note, The Need for a Rational
State and Local Response to Carbone: Alternate Means to Responsi-
ble, Affordable Municipal Solid Waste Management, 18 VA. ENvTL.
L.J. 129, 136-55 (1999).
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Commerce Clause. Indeed, the case underscores just
how powerful the judiciary has become under a judi-
cially-constructed doctrine, with federal trial judges in-
validating state environmental laws neutral in their ap-
plication - and written apparently precisely in the vein
of Dormant Commerce Clause exceptions that the Court
had previously carved out.313
The injunction also clearly offends in the eyes of the
environmental justice movement. Under this analysis,
it is to Judge Spencer's credit for leaving intact the pub-
lic hearing, local waste management plan, and in-
creased monitoring provisions of the laws. But even
under a most basic environmental justice critique, the
injunction falls short in its failure to allow Virginia to
protect its own environment. The judge found that Vir-
ginia's interests in protecting the environment were im-
portant, but by dismissing that contention at the in-
stant he thought he smelled discrimination emanating
from the law,314 he belied the point entirely. In fact, it is
uncertain that New York's garbage is identical to Vir-
ginia's, especially in light of the fact that medical waste
was recently discovered in a Waste Management ship-
ment from New York. 315 Further, the injunction order
ignores the argument that by capping the amount of
waste landfilled each day, Virginia may better monitor
whether that waste complies with its specified environ-
mental standards for landfill disposal. And by holding
313. The Court has at least twice noted that flat dumping
restrictions would be valid under the doctrine. See supra Parts
II.A.2, II.B. 1.
314. See Waste Management Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, No.
3:99CV425, mem. op. at 21 (E.D. Va. June 30, 1999). Again, it is
one thing to find discrimination in the actual law, and another
thing entirely to see it somewhere near the law.
315. See Bob Brown, WMI Fined for Dumping in Va., WASTE
NEWS, May 10, 1999, at 3. But see Dominic Perella, Medical Waste
Discovered in a Second Virginia Landfill, ASSOCIATED PRESS
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 13, 1999, at 00:04:00, available on Westlaw,
ALLNEWS library (reporting medical waste from a Richmond hos-
pital that was landfllled in Charles City County).
1999] 291
292 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
that the barging ban is not needed to protect the envi-
ronment, Judge Spencer surreptitiously transported
himself from the bench to the Virginia Senate floor: the
General Assembly clearly found that their previous
barging requirements were not adequate to protect the
environment, 316 and in any event, such a finding is for
the legislature not the judiciary.317
Besides falling short by foregoing important environ-
mental protections, the injunction also fails under envi-
ronmental justice's principle of distributional justice.
Because waste imported to Virginia disproportionately
lands in minority and impoverished counties, 318 restric-
tions on the Commonwealth's effort to ameliorate this
dilemma is contrary to the movement's goals. In fact,
there may also be an additional distributional concern
for Virginia: waste imported to the state also dispropor-
tionately impacts counties with significantly higher per-
centages of adults who do not have high school diplo-
mas. 31 9 Further, the injunction at once assaults the en-
vironmental justice movement's advancement of political
justice, self-determination, sovereignty, and home-as-
the-environment.
316. SeeVA. CODEANN. § 10.1-1454.2 (Michie 1999).
317. It is unclear whether waste transport by barge is more
environmentally friendly than by truck or rail, although the U.S.
Coast Guard believes it is. Apparently the Virginia General Assem-
bly disagreed, however. See id.; Bob Brown, Waste Imports: A Tale
of Two States: Va. Legislature Constructs Roadblock, WASTE NEWS,
Feb. 15, 1999, at 1 (quoting Virginia State Senator Bolling as say-
ing "If a barge sinks, then we've created an environmental catas-
trophe that could take a generation to correct.").
318. See supra Part W.A.
319. See infra Appendix E.
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J Virginia: PASW Imnports and Education
0
€Waste Imported in Waste Imported in
More Educated Less Educated
Counties than the Counties than the
State (based on % State (based on %
adults with HS adults with HS
diploma) diploma)
For the injunction bars enforcement of laws that en-
joyed wide political support,320 and also received much
approval in public polls. 321 In addition, it removes the
decision-making process about the environment and
natural resources not only away from counties or
smaller jurisdictions, but also from the state level where
those counties are more accurately represented.3 22
Such a result is not democratic, and it is not environ-
mentally just.
CONCLUSION
In the collective mind of our nation's highest Court,
the Dormant Commerce Clause is alive and well, strid-
ing along in perfect unison with the wakeful text of the
actual Commerce Clause. Despite this belief, the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause remains subject to copious and
cutting criticisms. This Note presents one more critique
of the doctrine - that of environmental justice - and
320. The landfill cap bill passed 97-0-1 in the Virginia
House, 40-0 in the Virginia Senate. The barge transport ban
passed 78-19-1 in the House, and 33-6-1 in the Senate. The addi-
tional monitoring provisions bill passed 97-0-1 in the House, 38-0-
1 in the Senate.
321. See Timberg, supra note 309.
322. Indeed, the landfill cap, for instance, would allow fa-
cilities to apply for increased tonnage allowances. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 10.1-1408.1 (Michie 1999). Presumably, localities would
have some input into such decisions.
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finds that there, too, the Dormant Commerce Clause se-
verely offends. Indeed, the Court's fairly recent exten-
sion of the doctrine into interstate waste hinders envi-
ronmental justice's advancement of distributional and
political justice, self-rule, and home-as-the-
environment. Environmental justice gives yet one more
reason to overturn the doctrine.
While the Court seems unlikely to overrule itself - de-
spite the Chief Justice's continuing dissents - Con-
gress has the explicit power to do so. But legislative ac-
tion on the federal level, although it would be well ad-
vised, 323 seems tenuous, with our nation's Senators and
Congressmen ever debating but still not deciding.32 4
This leaves states to craft environmental and legal inno-
vations of their own. Unfortunately, the waters of the
Dormant Commerce Clause are increasingly perilous,
with a recent preliminary injunction issued by a federal
trial court restraining Virginia from enforcing its new
environmentally-friendly, neutral-on-their face laws.
This injunction, too, besieges the goals of environmental
justice, and leaves states to fend for themselves. The
success of their fending, however, remains to be seen.
For now, only one thing is certain: more trash is on the
way.
323. For a proposal articulating how such legislation might
be crafted, see Lawrence, supra note 191, at 415-63.
324. At least six bills were introduced in 1999 that would
address the problems created by the Dormant Commerce Clause
for interstate waste. See S. 533, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 663, 106th
Cong. (1999); S. 872, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1190, 106th Cong.
(1999); H.R. 378, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 891, 106th Cong.
(1999). None of these bills, however, had made it past referral to a
subcommittee ot hearings as of July 29, 1999.
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APPENDIX A: PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
FROM THE PEOPLE OF COLOR LEADERSHIP SUMMIT
WE THE PEOPLE OF COLOR, gathered together at
this multinational People of Color Environmental Lead-
ership Summit, to begin to build a national and inter-
national movement of all peoples of color to fight the de-
struction and taking of our lands and communities, do
hereby re-establish our spiritual interdependence to the
sacredness of our Mother Earth; to respect and cele-
brate each of our cultures, languages and beliefs about
the natural world and our roles in healing ourselves; to
insure environmental justice; to promote economic al-
tematives which would contribute to the development of
environmentally safe livelihoods; and, to secure our po-
litical, economic and cultural liberation that has been
denied for over 500 years of colonization and oppres-
sion, resulting in the poisoning of our communities and
land and the genocide of our peoples, do affirm and
adopt these Principles of Environmental Justice:
1. Environmental justice affirms the sacredness
of Mother Earth, ecological unity and the interdepend-
ence of all species, and the right to be free from ecologi-
cal destruction.
2. Environmental justice demands that public
policy be based on mutual respect and justice for all
peoples, free from any form of discrimination or bias.
3. Environmental justice mandates the right to
ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land and re-
newable resources in the interest of a sustainable planet
for humans and other living things.
4. Environmental justice calls for universal pro-
tection from nuclear testing, extraction, production and
disposal of toxic/hazardous wastes and poisons and
nuclear testing that threaten the fundamental right to
clean air, land, water, and food.
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5. Environmental justice affirms the fundamental
right to political, economic, cultural and environmental
self-determination of all peoples.
6. Environmental justice demands the cessation
of the production of all toxins, hazardous wastes, and
radioactive materials, and that all past and current pro-
ducers be held strictly accountable to the people for
detoification and the containment at the point of pro-
duction.
7. Environmental justice demands the right to
participate as equal partners at every level of decision-
making including needs assessment, planning, imple-
mentation, enforcement and evaluation.
8. Environmental justice affirms the right of all
workers to a safe and healthy work environment, with-
out being forced to choose between an unsafe livelihood
and unemployment. It also affirms the right of those
who work at home to be free from environmental haz-
ards.
9. Environmental justice protects the right of vic-
tims of environmental injustice to receive full compen-
sation and reparations for damages as well as quality
health care.
10. Environmental justice considers governmen-
tal acts of environmental injustice a violation of inter-
national law, the Universal Declaration On Human
Rights, and the United Nations Convention on Genocide.
11. Environmental justice must recognize a spe-
cial legal and natural relationship of Native Peoples to
the U.S. government through treaties, agreements,
compacts, and covenants affirming sovereignty and self-
determination.
12. Environmental justice affirms the need for
urban and rural ecological policies to clean up and re-
build our cities and rural areas in balance with nature,
honoring the cultural integrity of all our communities,
and providing fair access for all to the full range of re-
sources.
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13. Environmental justice calls for the strict en-
forcement of principles of informed consent, and a halt
to the testing of experimental reproductive and medical
procedures and vaccinations on people of color.
14. Environmental justice opposes the destruc-
tive operations of multi-national corporations.
15. Environmental justice opposes military occu-
pation, repression and exploitation of lands, peoples
and cultures, and other life forms.
16. Environmental justice calls for the education
of present and future generations which emphasizes so-
cial and environmental issues, based on our experience
and an appreciation of our diverse cultural perspectives.
17. Environmental justice requires that we, as
individuals, make personal and consumer choices to
consume as little of Mother Earth's resources and to
produce as little waste as possible; and make the con-
scious decision to challenge and reprioritize our life-
styles to insure the health of the natural world for pres-
ent and future generations. 325
325. PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL
LEADERSHIP SUMMIT xiii (1991).
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APPENDIX B: MICHIGAN WASTE IMPORT AND DEMOGRAPHIC
DATA SUMMARY
CountyMSW
County imported 326 %Minority327 % Poverty
Washtenaw 1,492,829 16.2 12.2
Berrien 1,384,366 17.3 14.7
Monroe 987,189 3 8.8
Menominee 531,342 1.9 12.8
Genesee 477,072 21.8 16.5
Wayne 414,616 42.6 20.1
Shiawassee 181,980 1.6 10.6
Lenawee 69,413 5.6 10.4
Ontonagon 54,121 1.7 13.2
Alger 46,311 6.2 14.5
SaintSepn 41,550 41 11.5Joseph
Dickinson 31,300 1.2 10.8
Macomb 22,384 3.2 5.2
326. WASTE MANAGEMENT DIVISION, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrIY, REPORT OF SOLID WASTE LANDFILLED IN
MICHIGAN 10 (1999).
327. All demographic data- minority, poverty, and educa-
tion data- in Appendices B-E comes from the 1990 U.S. Census,
available on the internet. See United States Census Bureau, 1990
Census Lookup (1.4a) (visited July 26, 1999)
<http://www.census.gov>.
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Sanilac 461 1.8 14.3
Oakland 420 10.4 6
Midland 33 2.7 11.1
MICHIGAN 5,735,387 16.5 13.1
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300 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
APPENDIX C: OHIO WASTE IMPORT AND DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
SUMMARY
County MSWimported 328 % Minority %Poverty
Mahoning 708,271 16.5 15.9
Stark 339,047 7.5 11.1
Hamilton 113,723 22.3 13.3
Williams 54,107 1.3 7.6
Wood 30,690 3.3 10.6
Perry 24,993 0.5 19.1
Wyandot 21,533 0.8 8.5
Athens 18,505 5.6 28.7
Gallia 15,280 3.8 22.5
Ashtabula 12,502 4.2. 16.1
Ottawa 9318 2.7 7.2
Cuyahoga 6857 27.4 13.8
Lucas 6428 17.7 15.3
Brown 5258 1.3 14.2
328. DIVISION OF SOLID AND INFECTIOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT,
OHIO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 1998 OHIO SOLID WASTE
FACILITY DATA REPORT 36-46
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Jackson 5255 1.1 24.2
Mercer 4706 0.9 6.7
Warren 3216 3.1 6.8
Logan 1409 2.8 10.5
Defiance 210 6 8.8
Seneca 186 4.1 10.9
Columbiana 6 1.7 15.9
Fairfield 3 1.9 8.8
OHIO 1,381,503 12.2 12.5
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APPENDIX D: PENNSYLVANIA WASTE IMPORT AND
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA SUMMARY
CountyMSW
County imported 329 % Minority % Poverty
Bucks 2,146,662 4.9 4
Lacakawanna 1,562,583 1.5 10.7
York 542,800 4.8 6.3
Delaware 459,263 13.5 7
Dauphin 224,675 17.5 10.1
Somerset 213,837 0.5 14.3
Northampton 190,635 5.7 7.3
Erie 180,523 6.4 12.9
Franklin 156,080 3.3 8.3
Berks 150,496 6.3 8
Clarion 114,452 1.2 23.2
Elk 95,513 0.7 9.5
Allegheny 83,341 12.4 11.5
Butler 79,479 1.2 9.7
329. BUREAu OF LAND RECYCLING AND WASTE MANAGEMENT,
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, LANDFILL
WASTE RECEIPTS 1-40 (1997).
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Washington 55,591 3.8 12.8
Westmoreland 39,758 2.5 10.7
Schuylkill 27,167 1.1 10.7
Fayette 19,448 3.9 20.9
Cumberland 11,935 3.1 5.3
McKean 9698 2.3 14.9
Montgomery 5142 8.5 3.6
Indiana 4489 2.1 18.7
PENNSYLVANIA 6,373,567 11.4 11.1
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APPENDIX E: VIRGINIA WASTE IMPORT AND DEMOGRAPHIC
DATA SUMMARY
MSWmpt MSW Year %
County theo4thd Imports No HSin the 4th Est31 Minority Poverty Diploma
Quarter
3 E
Sussex 209,847 864,790 58.6 20.1 42.9
Charles 105,666 435,455 71.3 15.8 42.3
City
Amelia 99,345 409,406 32.3 10.9 42.9
King- 98,472 405,808 21.7 6 27.6George
Glouces- 85,632 352,894 12 8.4 26.3
ter
King&Qen 49,943 205,818 43.2 10.8 41.8Queen
PrinceWilla 17,315 71,356 16.5 3.2 13.4William
330. VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra
note 250, at 32.
331. I calculated the yearly estimate for each county by us-
ing each county's ratio of waste and applying it to the known yearly
total of 2.8 million tons imported. See VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrry, SOLID WASTE MANAGED IN VIRGINIA: FOURTH
QUARTER 1997 at 5 (1998).
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Brunswick 12,435 51,245 58.7 24.7 46
Bristol 784 3231 6.7 20.6 37.5
VIRGINIA 679,439 2,800,000 22.5 10.3 24.2

